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INTRODUCTION

"Jurisdiction must become venue," concluded Professor
Albert A. Ehrenzweig.' Perhaps it should. More certain is the
proposition that comprehending jurisdiction requires mastering
its relationship with venue. Such conclusions lie at some distance,
however, bringing to mind that every journey must begin with a
single step.
A solid first step takes me to the subject of this Symposium,
the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments. This, put simply, is a masterful work. Even while still in tentative drafts, it proved an invaluable aid to judge, practitioner, teacher, and student. Yet in a work
of such scope, anyone could find grounds for differing.
At the outset the Restatement Second states "the requirements
that must be met before a court properly may undertake [a civil]
adjudication": 2 notice,3 subject-matter jurisdiction,4 and territorial
In particular, adopting a view popular with
jurisdiction.'
academics, it requires that the exercise of territorial jurisdiction be
Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 ORE. L. REV. 103, 113
(1971).

2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to ch. 2, at 1 (Tent. Draft

No. 5, 1978); see id., ch. 1, at 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
' This concern of procedural due process subsumes opportunity to be heard. See id.
§ 5(l)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 2(1)(a)] [Throughout this Article, the corresponding
section numbers that will appear in the final Restatement Second are given in brackets after
citation to the tentative drafts.]; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1942). See also text

accompanying note 226 infra. This Article assumes satisfaction of these requirements.
' This means "authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 11]; see
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7 (1942). This Article generally does not treat this requirement. But see text accompanying notes 179-81 & 232 infra.
- Other names for this or similar concepts include judicial jurisdiction, adjudicatory
jurisdiction, adjudicatory authority, amenability, nexus, and substantive due process. I
propose "territorial authority to adjudicate" to encompass all of territorial jurisdiction and
venue.
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"reasonable" 6 as well as accord with certain nonconstitutional
restrictions.7 Herein I shall fault this approach to territorial jurisdiction and also its inadequate attention to venue.
In Part I of this Article, I shall first show that under the
cases territorial jurisdiction currently has two cumulative components of constitutional stature: power and reasonableness. Then I
shall note the intriguingly close ties of the reasonableness requirement to venue; exploring and defining that relationship will incidentally confirm the fruitfulness of considering self-imposed
limitations on jurisdictional reach as rules of venue. Thus this
Article reformulates the subject of territorial authority to adjudicate by relegating all nonconstitutional restrictions on geographic
selection of forum into that third category: venue. I believe that
this tripartite reformulation permits a clear and suggestive statement of the current law. And it induces an attractive vision of the
future-the demise of power, the emergence of reasonableness as
the sole constitutional test for territorial authority to adjudicate,
and the intelligent use of venue to narrow the choice of forum.
Having elaborated my proposed approach, I can in Part II
briefly review my differences with the Restatement Second. I contend that its treatment of this area neither accurately states the
current law nor adequately frames the relevant concepts so as to
facilitate reform.

I
PROPOSED APPROACH

A. Evolutionary View of the Current Law
1. Interpretive Survey of the Cases
Surely one could argue that "numerous law review articles
reinvent the wheel" by persistently reciting the history of the subject under study, and that this practice should more often yield to
shorter articles addressing "readers who are already sophisticated
in a field."' Nevertheless, I must here review thfe leading cases
on territorial jurisdiction, because my proposed approach emerges
from them, initially as a means of synthesizing seemingly
disparate and divergent threads in the case law. Yet in deference
6 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

id. H9 10-11 [§§ 7-8].
' See id. § 7 [§ 4].

H9 8-9 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§§ 5-6]; see

S Velvel, Suggested Improvements in Legal Education, 29

J.

LEGAL EDUC.

194, 201 (1978).
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to that radical style I shall be brief, and my survey will be interpretive rather than narrative.
a. 1878 - 1945: From Pennoyer to International Shoe. I break
into the law's development 9 at the classic Pennoyer v. Neff.10 The
Court there found a lack of territorial jurisdiction and thus, in the
old terminology," held that the state judgment under collateral
attack was void. In the course of so ruling, the Court established
the theoretical framework within which the doctrine of territorial
jurisdiction was to develop.
First, Pennoyer laid down its famous threefold categorization
of actions: in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem. 2 In personam
jurisdiction could result in a judgment imposing upon the defendant a personal liability or obligation in favor of the plaintiff. In
rem jurisdiction could result in a judgment affecting the interests
of all persons in a designated thing, such as a judgment registering title to land. Quasi in rem jurisdiction could result in a judgment affecting the interests of particular persons in a designated
thing. Further, there were two distinct varieties of proceedings
quasi in rem: in subtype-one, the plaintiff sought to establish a
pre-existing interest in the thing as against the defendant's interest, an example being a suit for foreclosure of a mortgage; in
subtype-two, the plaintiff sought to apply the defendant's property to the satisfaction of an unrelated claim against the defendant,
an example being an action for tort begun by attachment and
without personal jurisdiction."
Second, Pennoyer established, as a matter of due process, that
in any of the three categories of proceedings the adjudicating
' For a discussion of the earlier roots, see Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 252-62; Kalo, Jurisdictionas an EvolutionaryProcess: The
Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147; Developments in
the Law-State-CourtJurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 915-17 (1960). Compare Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The 'Tower" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L.J. 289, 292 (1956) ("[OQur rules of personal jurisdiction are [not] of ancient common law
origin.... [Prior to Pennoyer,] [f]orum conveniens ... was ... the basis of all personal jurisdiction."), and Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 105-07 (Pennoyer encrusted existing constitutional law-requiring only reasonable notice and opportunity to defend-with "power"),
with Levy, Mesne Process in PersonalActions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE
L.J. 52, 56 (1968) ("physical power was necessary for the initial obtaining of jurisdiction ...
at common law").
1095 U.S. 714 (1878). See generally Hazard, supra note 9, at 262-72.
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to ch. 2, at
4-8 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978); id., Introductory Note to ch. 5, at 4-9 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1979).
12 95 U.S. at 733-34.
" See generally RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to ch. 1, at 5-9 (1942).
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state must have power over the target of the action, whether such
target be a person or a thing.' 4 This was the Court's premise:
"The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established." '
During subsequent years, the courts by constitutional interpretation elaborated and expanded the traditional bases of power
for jurisdiction over a defendant: presence, 6 domicile,7 and
consent. 8 Moreover, and sometimes by circuitous route, the
courts added a basis of power by approving the exercise of personal jurisdiction with respect to claims arising out of certain acts
done by the defendant within the state, such as transacting
business, 9 owning real estate,2 0 litigating, 2' and committing a tor22
tious act.
Finally, the Supreme Court rationalized these developments
in the landmark case of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.2 The
Court there held that the state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation satisfied the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court noted that the
"clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.... But
to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of
the laws of that state" 24 and thus subjects itself to that state's personal jurisdiction. The courts were to locate this jurisdictional
boundary line by considering the level of the defendant's in-state
activity and the degree of that activity's relatedness to the asserted
" 95 U.S. at 722.
" Id. at 720; cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("foundation of jurisdiction is physical power").
1 See, e.g., Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A. 714 (1895). But see
note 74 and accompanying text infra.

'7 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).

18See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (approving on consent theory a state
statute subjecting nonresident motorists to personal jurisdiction with respect to in-state
accidents).
See, e.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co.v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
o See, e.g., Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (C.P. 1938).
SI

See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).

Cf. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953) (recasting Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), in terms of in-state act).
2

s 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See generally Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in
JurisdictionTheory?, 26 KAN. L. Rav. 61, 64-67 (1977); Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A

Review, 25 U. CHS. L. Rav. 569, 573-93 (1958).
24 326 U.S. at 319.
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claim.2" Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court stated the test differently, asking whether it was "reasonable and just, according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to
permit the state" 26 to exercise jurisdiction. Such an inquiry involved, among other things, an "'estimate
of the
inconveniences."' 2 7 In several places, however, the Court ambiguously tied the two different formulations together. For example,
the Court explained that the due process clause permitted the
state to exercise personal jurisdiction if the defendant had "certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 28 This ambiguity proved critical in later cases.
While the courts thus reworked Pennoyer's in personam category, they relatively neglected the in rem and quasi in rem
branches. Presence remained the sole basis of power for such
nonpersonal jurisdiction, although the courts showed some imagination in attributing location to intangibles. 9
b. 1945 - 1958: The Emergence of Reasonableness. With some
indulgence, one could read InternationalShoe as reducing the power test to the status of a rough rule of thumb, with its outcome
always subject to revision under the ultimate test of reasonableness. So to get to the basics, instead of asking whether the target
of the action was subject to the state's power, one should ask
whether jurisdiction was reasonable in view of all the interests involved. Indeed, in two leading cases the Supreme Court did so

" Id. at 317-19. The opinion's words in setting up the jurisdictional issue suggest that
the Court envisaged a test requiring power over the defendant. Id. at 316 (observing, as a
point of departure, that 'jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded
on their de facto power over the defendant's person").
26 Id. at 320. The Court ultimately concluded that the state's exercise of jurisdiction did
not constitute "an unreasonable or undue procedure." Id.
17 Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
1930)).
28 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see 326 U.S.
at 317 ("such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable,
in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend
the particular suit which is brought there"); id. at 319 ("the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure"). See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980).
2 See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (plaintiff could invoke quasi in rem
subtype-two jurisdiction over debt owing to defendant, by garnishment of debt where
debtor was temporarily present). But see notes 52 & 76 and accompanying text infra.
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read International Shoe, and thus expanded further the states' territorial jurisdiction under the Constitution."
First, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co."' drew the
logical conclusion that this shift to a reasonableness test rendered
the Pennoyer categorization of actions obsolete and superfluous; a
fluid inquiry into reasonableness would naturally take into
account all the shadings in the infinite variety of proceedings. At
issue in Mullane was New York's jurisdiction to conduct a judicial
settlement of accounts by the trustee of a New York common
trust fund, a statutory proceeding that would cut off all resident
and nonresident beneficiaries' rights against the trustee for improper management during the period covered by the accounting. The Court found jurisdiction to be reasonable and also
observed:
It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or
would classify the present proceeding, which has some characteristics and is wanting in some features of proceedings both in
rem and in personam. But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the
standards are so elusive and confused generally and which,
being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary
from state to state.... It is sufficient to observe that, whatever
the technical definition of its chosen procedure, the interest of
each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the
grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of
its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish
beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests
of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure
32
accords full opportunity to appear and be heard.
Second, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.3 1 elaborated

on the meaning of the reasonableness test. At issue on collateral
attack was California's jurisdiction in an action that a California
resident' had brought against a Texas insurance company. The
"oCf. Kurland, supra note 23, at 593-606, 608-10 (treating other relevant Supreme
Court cases during this period).
31 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See generally Fraser, Jurisdictionby Necessity-An Analysis
of the
Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 305, 305-12, 319 (1951).
32

339 U.S. at 312-13.

-1 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See generally Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer:
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. and JurisdictionOver Individuals, 30 ROcKy MTN.
L. REv. 285 (1958).

The court expressly noted the plaintiff's residence in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956), rev'd, 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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plaintiff had sought recovery as the beneficiary of a policy on her
son's life. The defendant's only contacts with California had been
mailing this solitary insurance contract to the son who resided
there and accepting premiums that he mailed from there. Again
the Court found jurisdiction to be reasonable, but only after noting the various interests at stake. The opinion indicated that
courts should decide such jurisdictional issues by balancing the
interests of the public,35 the plaintiff, 6 and the defendant. 7
c. 1958 - 1977: A Fleeting Resurgence of Power. Perhaps more
fairly, one could read InternationalShoe as simply supplementing
the bases of power. Under this view, the Constitution would authorize territorial jurisdiction where there was "de facto power"3 8
over the target of the action, or where the defendant's activities
justified a finding of "power" in a more metaphorical sense. The
Supreme Court adopted such a reading in Hanson v. Denckla.5 9
This was a hard case. Essentially at issue was Florida's jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a Delaware trust. As the Court
viewed the case, Florida needed either nonpersonal jurisdiction over
the trust assets or personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.
Nonpersonal jurisdiction did not exist, however, because Florida
could not say that the trust assets were in Florida. Personal jurisdiction was also lacking, because Florida could not exercise power
over a trustee who had had no contact with Florida other than
remitting trust income to the trust's settlor after she had moved
there and receiving her occasional instructions from there. So despite Florida's considerable contacts with the litigation as a whole,
the Court held that Florida could not exercise this jurisdiction,
thus braking the expansion of the states' territorial jurisdiction
while shedding new light on our two basic issues.
-1 "California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.... Often the crucial witnesses ... will
be found in the insured's locality." 355 U.S. at 223. The state had a "statute which subjects
foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts with residents of that
State." Id. at 221.
1 "These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable. When claims
were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment proof." Id.
at 223.
'" The Court considered the "inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit
in California," id. at 224, but the insurer had engaged "in economic activity" in California,
out of which activity this suit arose, id. at 223.
' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
39 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See generally Kurland, supra note 23, at 610-23; Scott, Hanson v.
Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REv. 695 (1959).
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First, the Hanson Court resurrected categorization of
actions.40 Indeed, its opinion elevated "in rem" and "in personam" to the level of italicized headings. 4 ' The best explanation
for such nostalgia is that any mention of a power test necessitates
categorization, because the question of power entails asking power
over what or whom.
Second, the Court did in fact return to a power test. True, at
least for personal jurisdiction "power" retained a metaphorical
connotation, requiring only "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 42 But without doubt the opinion rings of
power, not reasonableness-jurisdictional restrictions "are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless
he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."43
Hanson bucked the trend. Its peculiar facts, garbled reasoning, and seemingly obsolete approach were indeed puzzling. In
the ensuing years many commentators 44 and courts4 5 distinguished or effectively ignored it, while suggesting or taking a
more expansive approach to jurisdiction. And there the Supreme
Court let things lie for two decades. 6
d. 1977 - 1980: Synthesis. The Supreme Court recently revisited territorial jurisdiction, compensating for its long silence by
deciding a flurry of four major cases in less than three years.
These cases at last wove the threads of reasonableness and power
into a comprehensible doctrine. Shaffer v. Heitner47 was the first
357 U.S. at 246 & n.12.
4' Id. at 246, 250.
42 Id. at 253.
"' Id. at 251. The majority's use of the "contacts" language of International Shoe contrasts with the dissenting Justice Black's emphasis on its "fair play and substantial justice"
language. Id. at 259. Justice Black, the author of McGee, argued in Hanson for a reasonableness test and looked, just as did the majority, to InternationalShoe for support.
E.g., Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66
MICH. L. Rv. 227 (1967); Hazard, supra note 9.
" E.g., Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961).
" For Supreme Court cases of some relevance during this period, see Hazard, supra
note 9, at 244 & n.ll.
47 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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and most important of the quartet, because it at least suggested all
the current answers to the basic jurisdictional questions.
Alleging mismanagement occurring in Oregon, the plaintiff
in Shaffer sought to assert in Delaware state court a shareholder's
derivative suit against nonresident officers and directors of a Delaware corporation by going after their shares in the corporation.
Delaware deemed those shares to be located within the state and
permitted the plaintiff to sequester them, thus laying the foundation for jurisdiction quasi in rem subtype-two. However, the Supreme Court held that Delaware's exercise of jurisdiction violated
the due process clause.
First, the Court alluded to Mullane's noncategorizing
approach, but ultimately endorsed Hanson's resurrection of traditional categorization. 41 Indicatively, part III of its opinion took a
quasi in rem approach to the case,49 and part IV considered the
possibility of in personam jurisdiction. °
Second, the Court resolved which test applies to the various
jurisdictional categories. In part III, the Court explained that
jurisdiction quasi in rem, like the other categories, must pass the
reasonableness test."' The case at hand failed, seemingly because
of Delaware's attempt to categorize a suit as quasi in rem with the
sole apparent purpose of evading the restrictions on personal
jurisdiction.-" Even though Delaware may have had power over
the thing, its exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was not reason-

48 Id. at 196-206. The Court's ultimate point was that the same jurisdictional test
should apply to all categories, not that the categorization would have no effect on the
outcome of the test.
'9 Id. at 207-12. The Court stated the facts in part I and discussed categorization in
part II.
5o Id. at 213-17.
"' "The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem [or quasi in rem] the same test of fair
play and substantial justice' as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam is simple and
straightforward." Id. at 207. The Court described this test as "the fairness standard of
InternationalShoe." Id. at 211.
52 The Court catalogued the situations where nonpersonal jurisdiction would be
reasonable in view of the public's, the plaintiff's, and the defendant's interests, see text
accompanying notes 75-80 infra, but held that Shaffer was not among those situations. Indeed, Delaware's jurisdiction would be proper only if it passed muster as an exercise of
personal jurisdiction. "For in cases such as ... this one, the only role played by the property is to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into court.... In such cases, if a direct
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Constitution, it
would seem that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equally impermissible."
433 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted); see id. at 208 & n.29. This theorem, which required the
Court to overrule Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), became clearer in Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980); see text accompanying note 60 infra.
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able. Turning to the alternative possibility of jurisdiction in personam, the Court in part IV invoked a universally applicable power
test.53 Although the defendants were officers or directors as well
as stockholders of a Delaware corporation, they had not
"'purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State,' ... in a way that would justify
bringing them before a Delaware tribunal"; 4 and they had not
otherwise subjected themselves to the state's power. Even though
personal jurisdiction may have been reasonable, Delaware had no
power over the defendants. The surprising result, then, is that the
formulations of both McGee and Hanson survive: an assertion of
jurisdiction apparently must pass both the reasonableness and the
power tests.5
Not only did Shaffer rejoin the two divergent threads of
reasonableness and power into a peculiarly restrictive doctrine applicable to all categories of jurisdiction, but also it revealed the
threads' common origin in the tapestry of International Shoe. In
this light Shaffer's phrasing becomes eloquent: "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and
its progeny." 5 6 Three subsequent cases confirmed the implications of Shaffer.
Kulko v. Superior Court17 invalidated California's jurisdiction
over a New York defendant/husband in an action for child support, where the plaintiff/wife and the children had moved to Calithe
fornia. In personam jurisdiction failed the power test, because
58
defendant lacked any "relevant contact with the State."
-" After referring to InternationalShoe's due-process standard of "minimum contacts,"
the Court concluded that "Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over [the defendants) is inconsistent with that constitutional limitation on state power." 433 U.S. at 216-17.
Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); cf. Armstrong v.
Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176-80 (Del. 1980) (consent statute cures lack of power). Other
interests, such as those of the state, are irrelevant under a pure power test; and the Court
so considered them. 433 U.S. at 214-15.
" The requirement of cumulatively applying the two tests may have been implicit in
the Shaffer Court's phrase of "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation." 433 U.S. at 204. That requirement became more explicit in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Shaffer and World-Wide as the last defender of an exclusive
test of reasonableness, highlighted the nature as well as the restrictiveness of the Court's
new approach. 433 U.S. at 219-28; 444 U.S. at 299-313.
m 433 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted); see note 28 supra; note 73 infra.
57 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
5s Id. at 101. The Court could therefore skirt the reasonableness issue, avoiding the
admittedly difficult task of actually weighing the interests of California and the plaintiff.
See id. at 98-101.
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Rush v. Savchuk59 struck down Minnesota's assertion of jurisdiction quasi in rem subtype-two in an action arising from an outof-state automobile accident, where the resident plaintiff sought
to garnish the nonresident defendant's liability insurance contract
on the basis that the insurer did business in Minnesota. The
Court found such jurisdiction unreasonable; Minnesota could not
fairly overcome its lack of in personam jurisdiction by refusing so
to categorize the action."
Finally, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 6 rejected
Oklahoma's attempt to extend its in personam power to nonresident automobile dealers in a products liability litigation, where the
nonresident plaintiffs had suffered an accident while passing
through Oklahoma. In relatively unambiguous terms, the Court
explained that with respect to jurisdiction, the due process clause
can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that
the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in
a federal system.6 2
The former of these protections "is typically described in terms of
'reasonableness' or 'fairness.'... Implicit in this emphasis on
reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate
case be considered in light of other relevant factors," that is, the
public's and the plaintiff's interests." The latter limitation looks
59 444 U.S. 320 (1980).

' The key to this conclusion is that the Court never inquired into the reasonableness
of jurisdiction in light of all interests in the litigation, see id. at 332, which would have been
the only question if the Court had allowed presence of property to satisfy any power test.
Instead, the Court simply prohibited this use of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see id. at 328-30,
which apparently would have permitted an unreasonable circumvention of the restrictions
on personal jurisdiction. This analysis explains both the Court's derogation of the quasi in
rem approach as ingenious but fictitious, id. at 328, and also its rejection of the realistic
direct-action analogy, id. at 330-3 1. In short, the state had to have jurisdiction over the
defendant-the insured.
Thus, treating the action as an in personam proceeding against the insured, the Court
followed Kulho and found a lack of power, because the insured had no contacts with the
forum state. Id. at 327-33.
61 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
62 Id. at 291-92.
' Id. at 292. The Court mentioned the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the interstate judicial system's interest in efficiently resolving controversies, the states'
common interest in furthering substantive social policies, and the plaintiff's interest in
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to the defendant's contacts with the forum state and, "acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment" even where the
balance of interests indicates that jurisdiction would be eminently
reasonable.'
2. Current State of the Law

a. Doctrine. The Supreme Court's recent return to territorial
jurisdiction has done much to clarify the law, although perhaps
not to improve or stabilize it. The current law for determining the
propriety of state-court jurisdiction under the due process clause
is, first, to categorize the action and, second, to apply both the
power and the reasonableness tests.
So we still have categories of jurisdiction, just as Pennoyer said
more than a century ago. However, these categories need not conform precisely to Pennoyer's threefold framework, even though the
Supreme Court continues to speak in such terms for convenience. 61 It would serve us well to redistribute the original categories into jurisdiction over persons, jurisdiction over things (including in rem and quasi in rem subtype-one), and attachment
jurisdiction (including the remnants of quasi in rem subtypetwo).6

Perhaps it would be desirable to create more categories. 7

But although the categories may change slightly, categorization
generally along the traditional lines remains necessary as long as
jurisdiction turns on a notion of power-because the question of
power translates into power over whom or what.
The requirement that the sovereign have power over the
target of the action has evolved considerably beyond Pennoyer's
physical-power approach. Despite the somewhat medieval tone of
the word, power here and now embraces the rather broad concept of "minimum contacts" mapped by Hanson and the later
progeny of InternationalShoe. For personal jurisdiction, power can
obtaining relief "at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's
power to choose the forum." Id.
6 Id. at 294.
1 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 & n.17 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 246 & n.12 (1958).
' See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 612-13 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 9, Comments a-b (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 6].
6 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977) (jurisdiction over status);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 & n.13 (1958) (suggesting jurisdiction by necessity
and jurisdiction over status, respectively, by citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950), and Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297
(1942)).
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rest not only on presence, domicile, and consent, but also on a
more metaphorical basis definable only by aggregating the case
law; 68 at the least, power exists over a defendant who has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state. For nonpersonal jurisdiction, however,
power still depends on presence. In short, the common element
in the modern power test is the focus on the out-of-court relation
of the target of the action to the forum state.
The requirement of reasonableness with regard to the litigation arose from the Court's emphasis on "fair play and substantial
justice" in the early progeny of InternationalShoe. This relatively
lenient test is basically similar for the different categories of jurisdiction, although the varying effects of the different kinds of
judgment naturally enter into the wide-ranging consideration of
reasonableness. Indeed, this multifactored inquiry into the fairness of forum selection should cover the whole range of interests
69
possessed by the public, the plaintiff, and the actual defendant.
Thus, the diagnostic key for distinguishing the reasonableness test
from the power test, which looks only at the contacts of the defendant or thing with the forum state, is that an inquiry into
reasonableness considers many interests, including those of the
forum state and the plaintiff.
Of course, the state may choose not to exercise its full constitutional powers and so place further limitations on its jurisdictional reach. Such self-restraint is not yet my concern."
b. Basic Applications. Applying the doctrine elucidates it. Consider a case in which jurisdiction is categorized as in personam.
See text accompanying notes 144-60 infra.
See notes 35-37 & 63 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying notes 192-207
infra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDMENTS, Reporter's Note § 8 at 67-68 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 5]. In Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 150-51, 545 P.2d 264,
268, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1976), the court phrased the inquiry this way:
We next consider whether it would be fair and reasonable to subject defendant to the jurisdiction of California in light of the inconvenience to him in
defending an action in this state, when balanced against the interests of plaintiff in suing locally and of the state in assuming jurisdiction.
[Previously] we listed some of the considerations involved in this balance:
the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution
in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum
for its residents or regulating the business involved; the ease of access to an
alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant's local activities.
To See text accompanying notes 137-41 infra.
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Usually the court will first apply the power test, that being the
higher hurdle for most such cases. If there is no power, there is
no jurisdiction.7 If there is power, then the court must consider
reasonableness.72 In a case brought under a long-arm statute, for
example, reasonableness normally follows a fortiori from a finding of power, because looking at interests in addition to the defendant's most often favors jurisdiction." But in the example of
a case based solely on the defendant's transient presence, reasonableness might be absent despite the existence of power, because
taking the defendant's interests fully into account disfavors
jurisdiction. 74 At any rate, an exercise of personal jurisdiction
must pass both tests.
Next consider jurisdiction over things, either in rem or quasi
in rem subtype-one. To satisfy the power test, the plaintiff normally must bring the action where the thing is. Reasonableness
will then be the key test, allowing jurisdiction when, for example,
"claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant."7 5 Noteworthy here is the play in the process of identifying the thing in
dispute and attributing an in-state situs to it, especially for intangibles: arguably, courts must now ask, as a special aspect of the

' Thus, Hanson, Shaffer, Kulko, Rush, and World-Wide decided only the power issue
with respect to jurisdiction over the person. Power being absent, it was irrelevant that
jurisdiction might be reasonable in, say, Shaffer.
' "If a defendant has certain judicially cognizable ties with a State, a variety of factors
relating to the particular cause of action may be relevant to the determination whether the
exercise of jurisdiction would comport with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
" See, e.g., CleveRock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358, 1364 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980). This might explain why the InternationalShoe Court did
not wholly extricate the reasonableness inquiry from the power test. See note 28 and
accompanying text supra.
71 Commentary, especially recently, has strongly opposed transient jurisdiction. E.g.,
Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrantfor the Transient Rule of In PersonamJurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979); Ehrenzweig, supra note 9; Glen, An Analysis of "Mere
Presence" and Other TraditionalBases of Jurisdiction,45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 607 (1979) (limiting criticism to jurisdiction based on fortuitous, inadvertent, or coerced presence); Werner,
Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-OrientedJurisdiction,45
BROOKLYN L. REV. 565 (1979); TransientJurisdiction-Remnantof Pennoyer v. Neff: A Round
Table, 9 J. PuB. L. 281 (1960); Comment, Minimum Contacts Analysis of In PersonamJurisdiction Over Individuals Based On Presence, 33 ARK. L. REV. 159 (1979). Admittedly, the courts
have not yet followed the commentators' suggestion. See, e.g., Donald Manter Co. v. Davis,
543 F.2d 419 (Ist Cir. 1976); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980);
Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v.
Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 687-88, 273 N.W.2d 285, 286-87 (1979) (dictum).
" Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
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jurisdictional inquiry, whether the state reasonably performed this
reification process.76
Finally, consider attachment jurisdiction, as where the plaintiff by proper procedure attaches the defendant's property in the
state to pursue an unrelated claim against the defendant. Again
because power exists, reasonableness with regard to the litigation
will be the key test. Among the situations that pass this test are
those where personal jurisdiction would be constitutional,7 7 where
the action serves as security for a judgment being sought
elsewhere,78 where the action seeks to enforce a judgment,7 9 and
perhaps where no other forum is available."
Noteworthy here is
the play in the process of categorization: arguably, courts must
now ask whether the state had a reasonable purpose in categorizing the action as attachment jurisdiction and thereby evading the
restrictions on personal jurisdiction."
' The Hanson Court faced this reification issue in ruling that the trust assets were not
in Florida, but the Court managed to duck it in Shaffer and Rush. But cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1971) (applying only reasonableness test directly to
exercise of jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 9, Comment e (Tent.

Draft. No. 5, 1978) (same) [§ 6]. See generally Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against
Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 950-53; note 29 supra.
There is nothing unique about asking whether the assertion of power over things is
somehow reasonable. The same question arises for attachment jurisdiction. A very similar
question arises in personal jurisdiction, where reasonableness marks the outer limit on the
state's ability to stretch the power metaphor. See text accompanying notes 147-60 infra.
Analogously, reasonableness limits the state's ability to categorize a proceeding. See note 81
and accompanying text infra.
Admittedly, these ubiquitous questions concerning the reasonableness of power are
largely superfluous or meaningless. Indeed, they nicely reveal the bankruptcy of the power
concept. See note 160 and accompanying text infra.
7 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 & n.29 (1977).
7 Id. at 210; see Note, Attachment JurisdictionAfter Shaffer v. Heitner, 32 STAN. L. REv.
167 (1979).
7 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977).
o Id. at 211 n.37; see Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdictionover Foreigners, 12 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 67 (1979); note 231 infra.
"' See notes 52 & 60 and accompanying text supra. The Court in Shaffer and Rush
found unreasonable categorization, and therefore required power over the person. But Cf.
Hazard, Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 711, 718-19 (1979) (applying only reasonableness test directly to exercise of jurisdiction); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 72-74 (1978) (seeing role for attachment jurisdiction wherever
contacts insufficient for personal jurisdiction).
There is nothing unique about asking whether the categorization is reasonable. A very
similar question is when jurisdiction over things can substitute for personal jurisdiction. Cf.
Carrington & Martin, supra note 44, at 235-36 (indispensable-party rule). Compare New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916) (garnishment of debt in dispute did not
provide jurisdiction sufficient for interpleader), with Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957) (suggesting opposite result under Mullane approach), cert.
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c. Application to FederalCourts. Until this point I have implicit-

ly limited discussion to the due-process limits on the territorial
jurisdiction of state courts. To extend this discussion of current
doctrine to federal district courts, I first note the traditional axiom: the due process clause of the fifth amendment imposes no
jurisdictional impediment to the federal courts' reaching anywhere within the territorial limits of the United States.12 Accordingly, Congress or its rulemaker may authorize nationwide service
of federal process, as they have done in specific instances such as
interpleader. s
However, the federal system has always exercised selfrestraint regarding its jurisdictional reach.8 As a general matter,
denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), and St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Meyer, 364 Mo. 1057, 272 S.W.2d 249
(1954) (suggesting that opposite result follows from loosening of limits on jurisdiction over
things), appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 942 (1955). A similar question also exists as to when
personal jurisdiction can substitute for jurisdiction over things. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 55, Comment c (1971) (for example, suit to partition foreign land);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 9, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 6];
Carrington & Martin, supra note 44, at 233-34. See also note 76 and accompanying text
supra.

" See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("due process requires only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign that

has created the court"); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 191-92 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); lovino v.
Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). See generally
ALI

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

437-38

(1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.10,
at 620 (2d ed. 1977) ("No such constitutional limitations confine the federal judicial system,
which has legal authority throughout the nation."); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 64, at 304-05 (1976). There is no jurisdictional impediment even in
diversity cases. See ALI STUDY, supra, at 437-41. But see National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.

Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 331 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that limits on state
courts constitutionally restrict federal-court reach in diversity cases).
The axiom is significantly misleading, however, because the due process clause of the
fifth amendment restricts federal venue. See text accompanying notes 115-23 infra. I shall
contend that this restriction is equivalent to the reasonableness component of the Shaffer
formulation. See text accompanying note 124 infra. See also note 132 infra.

Also, the fifth amendment imposes limits on the foreign reach of federal courts analogous to those on the reach of state courts. See Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497

(S.D.N.Y. 1974); 2 MooRE's

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

4.25[5], at 4-260 to -261 (2d ed. 1980);

§ 24, Comment e (1971);

RESTATEMENT

§ 7, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 4]; Foster, Long-Arm

Jurisdictionin Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 9, 36.
's 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976); see FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (100-mile
bulge provision). See also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§§ 1125-1126 (1969).
On the respective roles of Congress and the courts in delineating federal jurisdiction,
see Foster, supra note 82, at 11.

See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946); Robertson v.
Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925). See also Abraham, ConstitutionalLimitations upon
the TerritorialReach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 532-33 (1963); Blume, Place of
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the federal courts reach only as far as the local state courts can. 5
Sometimes the applicable federal statute or rule incorporates by
reference or implication the various state jurisdictional limits.8 5
Sometimes the Erie doctrine dictates the similar application of
state law. 7 And even where the federal courts feel free to define
their own reach, they adopt the due-process limits on state-court
jurisdiction.8 In short, the jurisdictional doctrine heretofore discussed applies in the federal district courts, unless specifically
modified by federal statute or rule.
d. Summary. The current law of territorial jurisdiction re-

quires courts to categorize first and then test for power and
Trial of Civil Cases: Early English and Modern Federal, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1949);
Comment, FederalJurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and the Erie Doctrine, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 685, 690-95 (1964).
5 See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1107-08, 1118-21 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT,
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 166-67, 768-73 (4th ed. 1978); 2
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
4.25[7] (2d ed. 1980); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note

83, § 1075; Foster, supra note 82, at 9-28.
H An example would be, out-of-state service pursuant to the second sentence of FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(e). See, e.g., Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 449 F.2d 775 (10th
Cir. 1971). See also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 83, § 1075, at 312-14; text
accompanying notes 128-29 infra.
When a federal court so applies "state law," it applies both the jurisdictional limitations self-imposed by state statute or rule and those imposed on the state by the Federal
Constitution. See 4 C. WRIrHT & A. MILLER, supra note 83, § 1075, at 316; Foster, supra
note 82, at 38-39.
' An example would be in-state service pursuant to FED. R. Clv. P. 4(d)(3) on a statecreated claim. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). See also 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 83, § 1075, at 303-12; text accompanying notes 221-24
infra.
H An example would be in-state service pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3) on a federally created claim. See, e.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1968); Lone
Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954); Scott v. Middle
East Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345
U.S. 663, 666-67 (1953) (by implication) (new service after removal). See also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 85, at 1119; 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

4.25[7], at 4-290 to -291

(2d ed. 1980).
The text gives the most widely accepted view. A possible, more restrictive view is that
the federal courts should adopt all of the forum state's jurisdictional law as the federal
common law. Cf. Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 228 n.9 (2d Cir. 1963) (suggesting this
view as possibility). A much more permissive alternative, with slightly more support, is that
the federal courts should apply only the jurisdictional restrictions that the Constitution and
international law impose on the nation as a whole. First Flight Co. v. National Carloading
Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Green, FederalJurisdictionIn Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961); see Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355
F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (semble); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 389-90 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (dictum).
I shall consider the wisdom of the current view at text accompanying notes 130-33
infra.
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reasonableness. As radically strange and strangely reactionary as
this formulation sounds, it seems to be the message of the
cases."9 In extracting that formulation, I have tried to show how
it solves certain celebrated problems of case interpretation.
Seemingly different lines of cases were simply developing or stressing different ideas, which the Court has now integrated into a
comprehensible doctrine. Of course, some of the Court's language
does not quite fit, often because of inconsistencies in terminology;
but to an eye-opening degree, the holdings and essential language
fall into place.90 Also, I have explored the major implications of
the current doctrine, because this is the law under which we shall
live for years to come. Finally, in extracting and exploring the
doctrine, I have laid the groundwork for exposing its inadequacies and showing the need for a new approach, tasks to which
I now turn.

"' Accord, e.g., Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155,
158-59 (9th Cir. 1980); Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm JurisdictionFinally Exceeds Its Reach: A
Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L.

REv. 407, 422 & n.107 (1980); 11

STAN.

L.

REV.

344 (1959).

In his response to this Article, Professor Hazard somewhat misstates my position and
then proceeds to champion the view that the recent Supreme Court cases have somehow
injected reasonableness into power to create a single jurisdictional test. He seemingly would
require no more than a reasonable transactional nexus. Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 564,
570-72 (1981). I read this to be a rewording of the test that he earlier phrased as "minimum contacts between the forum and the transaction in litigation." Hazard, supra note 9,
at 281.
Such a view simply does not accord with the Court's statement of its position in WorldWide. See text accompanying note 62 supra. Moreover, no single test can explain why the
Shaffer Court shifted from its broad focus on all interests when dealing with nonpersonal
jurisdiction in part III of its opinion to its narrow focus on contacts for personal jurisdiction in part IV. Finally, to the extent any single test emphasizes reasonableness, as Professor
Hazard's test does, it fails to explain why the Court in Hanson, Kulko, Rush, and World-Wide
restricted its focus to the out-of-court relation of the target of the action to the forum
state. Therefore, I justify my slightly more complicated formulation by pointing to the
complications in the cases themselves.
Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that we should forever remain bound by the implicit complications of current case law. The rest of this Article argues for an evolution toward
a single test of reasonableness. Also, I shall present a reformulated framework for analysis.
As Professor Hazard recognizes, 66 CORNELL L. REV. at 572, the validity of that reformulation ultimately does not depend on resolving in my favor our differences regarding the
meaning of these recent Supreme Court cases.
9' Mullane alone seems endangered, as power was lacking there. Indeed, Mullane falls
unless there is a jurisdiction-by-necessity exception to the current scheme. See Fraser, supra
note 31, at 311, 319; notes 67 & 81 supra. But Mullane's result is so obviously right that its
endangerment casts doubt on the whole current scheme. See note 146 and accompanying
text infra; note 203 infra.
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B. Predictive View of the Current Law
1. Relationship of TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue
Expounding the current doctrine of territorial jurisdiction
raises policy problems whose resolution demands an unexpected
preliminary step: studying how the doctrine relates to venue. I
shall do this initially in the context of the federal district-court
system, where the relationship of territorial jurisdiction and venue
is more suggestive of a solution; but after reformulating the relationship there, I shall extend the discussion to state courts.
a. Common History. Territorial jurisdiction and venue were
largely indistinguishable concepts for more than the first half of
the existence of the federal courts. Under the First Judiciary Act,
the governing provision for both stated:
[N]o person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another,
in any civil action ....

And no civil suit shall be brought ...

against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,
or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the
writ ....

9'

In those days this meant that personal jurisdiction and venue
were normally proper in the same districts.9 2 And under the prevailing power theory of jurisdiction and the ancient local-action
doctrine,9" jurisdiction and venue for actions in rem and quasi in
rem were normally both proper in the same district as well.94
In 1887 Congress distinguished the two requirements by superimposing a venue scheme essentially equivalent to the modern
one.9" Although still both territorial jurisdiction and venue lim" Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. See generally 15 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3802 (1976); note 84 and
accompanying text supra.
' See 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.140[3], at 1322 (2d ed. 1980); Barrett, Venue
and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv. 608, 60910 (1954).
" See generally Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 42, at 178-79.
' See Blume, Actions Quasi In Rem Under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MICH. L. REv.
1, 29 (1951); Blume, supra note 84, at 35.
(tN]o civil suit shall be brought.., against any person by any original process of
[sic] proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but
where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between
citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendent [sic] ....
Judiciary Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (a)-(b) (1976)).
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ited where a plaintiff could bring an action, the former continued to prescribe "the court's power to adjudicate" while the
latter undertook to specify "the place where that authority may be
exercised." 96 Venue thus took on a new restrictiveness in a
rather crude attempt "to insure that litigation is lodged in a convenient forum and to protect defendant against the possibility
that plaintiff will select an arbitrary place in which to bring
suit." 97 Nevertheless, in subsequent practice the two concepts remained closely linked,98 and in today's litigation, they still repeatedly intersect.9

Indeed, some of the differences that emerged in the last century may now be disappearing. Venue has recently become more
permissive and rational, for example, by usually offering as a
choice the district "in which the claim arose." "I At the same
time, territorial jurisdiction has expanded in the same direction,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 91, § 3801, at 5. See also A.
D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL § 2-1 (4th ed. 1980);
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 82, § 12.1.
9 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 83, § 1063, at 203.
" For example, the Neirbo doctrine provided for simultaneous satisfaction of the two
requirements when a corporation had designated an agent for service of process. Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); see HART & WECHSLER, supra note
96

15 C.

WRIGHT,

EHRENZWEIG,

85, at 1121-22, 1124.
Of course, some developments after 1887 further separated territorial jurisdiction and
venue, such as the authorization of statewide service of process by FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) and
the enactment of various special venue statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976).
11 For example, venue in actions against aliens is proper wherever the plaintiff can
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 91, § 3810. Conversely, jurisdiction exists in patent infringement actions wherever the
plaintiff can satisfy the venue requirement. See Barrett, supra note 92, at 623-24. The two
requirements thus fold together.
Venue in antitrust and securities actions generally lies wherever the defendant is an
inhabitant or may be found. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 91,
§§ 3818, 3824.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976), venue in an action against a corporate defendant
generally lies wherever it is "doing business," the definition of which should turn on jurisdictional law. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.COOPER, supra note 91, § 3811, at 64-71.
But see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 85, at 1123 (suggesting more stringent standard for
venue). The same definitional point holds true for the antitrust corporate defendant that
"transacts business" under 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 91, § 3818, at 110-11.
Venue and territorial jurisdiction receive the same treatment with respect to the manner of raising and waiver, see FED. R. Civ. P. 12, transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976),
see Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), and transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976),
see Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway,
572 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978).
100 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a)-(b) (1976)).
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usually allowing suit where the claim arose. More significantly, as
jurisdiction has moved toward notions of fairness and convenience, it has come to serve many of the purposes of venue. Hence
pressure for closer alignment grows: obvious questions include
why jurisdiction may sometimes be lacking in the fairest venue,
and why venue may sometimes be improper where jurisdiction is
very reasonable and available.' 0'
b. Similar Purposes. Several courts and commentators have
gone beyond the traditional view of territorial jurisdiction as power and of venue as the place to exercise that power,0 2 and have
recognized the intimate connection between the two doctrines in
federal court. Indeed, concluding that the two serve similar purposes, but that redundancy leads to sometimes clumsy application
and impedes reform, a few of these authorities have suggested
some sort of doctrinal merger.
Where is the connection? The traditional view resulted from
focusing only on the ends of a spectrum with territorial jurisdiction at the pure-power end and venue at the mere-convenience
end. It is now apparent that at least jurisdiction extends into the
middle zone of fairness and gross inconvenience. Thus, the doctrines are connected. "Both are designed to test the fairness to the
defendant and the degree of inconvenience caused him by requiring him to litigate in a particular court." 1' But how then to
maintain the distinction? One court recently explained "that the
question of jurisdiction, which is relatively more concerned with
fairness, is distinct from that of venue, which is more concerned
with convenience." 11 But this distinction seemingly intimates the
doctrines' redundancy. So how then to unite them?
Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr.,' suggested a scheme of
nationwide service of federal process, whereby the task of ensur-

101See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 42, at 172-73.
102 See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra. The traditional view has created its
share of confusion. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 91, § 3801, at 4
n.4; notes 216 & 222 and accompanying text infra. The courts and commentators going
beyond the traditional view are those discussed in notes 103-08 and accompanying text
infra.
,01 Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966).
,04 Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
1-5 Barrett, supra note 92, at 627-35. Accord, F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 82,
§ 12.11, at 622; C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 42, at 172, § 64, at 305.
The American Law Institute chose a similar route for federal-question and certain
diversity cases. ALI STUDY, supra note 82, §§ 1314-1315, 2372, 2374. Accord, A.
EHRENZWEIG, D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 96, § 54.
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ing a reasonably convenient forum would fall solely on a new
federal venue statute. A plaintiff could generally lay venue in any
district where the wrongful act or a part thereof had occurred or
where any defendant resided. Professor Barrett would also provide for transfer of venue. °6
Professor David P. Currie'07 took a different route to union.
He suggested abolishing the concepts of federal venue and transfer of venue, and would look solely to the restrictions of a new
federal long-arm statute to ensure a convenient forum. Long-arm
service would generally extend from any district where a substantial part of the events in suit had occurred, where any defendant
resided if all defendants resided in the same state, or where any
defendant resided if all defendants resided in this country and if
service was not otherwise possible. 0
This focus on the middle zone between territorial jurisdiction
and venue represents a major advance, because it reveals the doctrines' connection and redundancy. But such analysis does not
offer a complete solution, either because the doctrinal distinction
remains fuzzy or because attempted union proves unsatisfactory
in a number of ways. First, Currie's choice to preserve the concept
of jurisdiction opposes Barrett's preference for venue. Such a
polarization implies that neither offers the optimal route. Second,
squeezing everything into either jurisdiction or venue will carry
over unwanted doctrinal baggage of these old ideas. For example,
problems of collateral attack' 09 or Erie questions 0 might turn on
One commentator offered a theoretically similar but practically extreme proposal for
"federal causes of action." He would adopt a Barrett-like approach, but would permit a
plaintiff to lay venue in any district. Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing Federal
Cases: An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by Venue Restrictions, 37 GEo.

L. Rv. 82, 84, 100 (1968).
Professor Barrett did not consider the foreign reach of federal process. See Barrett,
supra note 92, at 609 n.2. He would treat all nonpersonal proceedings as local actions. See
id. at 634.
107 Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U. Cm. L. REv.
268, 299-311 (1969).
A similar proposal, except that a federal court with jurisdiction could freely transfer
the case within the federal system, appeared in Keeffe, Twenty-Nine Distinct Damnations of
WASH.
106

the Federal Practice-And a National Ministry of Justice, 7

VAND.

L. REv. 636, 647-54, 656-57

(1954).
0I Professor Currie's long-arm would reach appropriate parties outside the United
States. See Currie, supra note 107, at 300 n.412. He would abolish the traditional categorization of proceedings. See id. at 301, 305 n.441.
,0 See note 216 and accompanying text infra. A desire to control the result of collateral
attack caused Professor Currie to depart from the Barrett approach. See Currie, supra note
107, at 303-04.
"I See note 222 and accompanying text infra.
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the single chosen label. A less constraining approach might yield
more discriminating solutions. Third, these proposals are too specific. Their basic intellectual frameworks do not readily transfer to
the state-court setting. Admittedly, this drawback is merely unfortunate, not damning. Fourth, and perhaps most telling, these
proposals are also too broad. By focusing on the overlap in the
middle, they ignore the ends of the spectrum. Jurisdiction and
venue serve some distinct as well as some similar purposes. A closer look at these purposes is necessary to create a theoretical
framework that can handle them all.
c. Parallel Structure. A careful look at territorial jurisdiction
has already discerned two cumulative components: power and
reasonableness. Upon closer inspection, federal venue also reveals
a dual structure.
The more widely perceived aspect of federal venue is largely
statutory. It undertakes the mundane task of distributing judicial
business around the country in a purportedly convenient, efficient, or otherwise desirable manner. For example, the general
venue statute provides that a federal-question case may lie in the
district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose,',
and that a case founded only on diversity jurisdiction may lie in
the district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or where
the claim arose."2 A more extreme example is the special statute
dictating that a transitory action against a national bank lies only
in the district in which the bank has its principal office."' Congress has also provided for transfer of venue, which allows the
4
courts to narrow the choice of venue on a case-by-case basis.1
The more hidden aspect of venue derives from the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which establishes a minimum
standard or floor that the statutory venue scheme must exceed to
survive constitutional challenge. This floor requires that the place
of litigation be fundamentally fair. For example, despite any provision for nationwide service of process and any statutory venue
authorization, an action could not be brought in a district wholly
unconnected with the litigation and grossly inconvenient for the
defendant. If such a case were not transferable to a proper feder-

"

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).

112 28

U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976).

1" 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976); see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 91,
§ 3813.
"1 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976); see Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest
of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J. 99, 137-38 (1965).
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al forum," 5 the court should dismiss for improper
venue or
6
conveniens.Y
non
forum
of
ground
the
on
perhaps
Arguments for the existence of this second aspect of federal
venue rest more on logic than on case law. The issue arises rarely
in the courts." 7 The constitutional requirement apparently is not
...
See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976).
U6 Federal forum non conveniens survived the enactment of the transfer provisions, but
it now applies only where the case is exceptional and the more convenient forum is a state
or foreign court. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 91, § 3828. With
the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens so contracted and with the modern idea of
due process so expanded, what we call federal forum non conveniens may conceivably be
available only where due process dictates outright or conditional dismissal. See Latimer v.
S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867
(1949), on remand, 91 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). But see Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic
Regent, 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 248 (1980); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 431 (9th Cir. 1977). Concomitantly,
this continued use of forum non conveniens by the federal courts may supply some proof,
albeit weak and ambiguous, of the existence of this constitutional aspect of venue.
State forum non conveniens (and, for that matter, transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1976)) also involves considerations similar to due process, but it extends considerably
beyond the range of that constitutional clause. The difference is one of degree, with forum
non conveniens looking to convenience and other such considerations but due process
interceding only when the balance tips toward violation of fundamental fairness. As a
theoretical matter, it is sounder to separate the discretionary doctrine from the constitutional command, and thus apply the term "forum non conveniens" only when a court
declines jurisdiction in the absence of constitutional compulsion. See F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 82, § 12.29.
"' See, e.g., Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 871 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (despite
provision for nationwide service, due-process reasonableness test applies); Oxford First
Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-204 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("We reject
the notion that there are no limitations upon extraterritorial service of process under
federal statutes such as the securities acts; the existence of the Fifth Amendment would
indicate otherwise. However, [there is] persuasive justification for upholding the view that
any constitutional due process limitations upon a federal extraterritorial (nationwide) service of process statute must be broadly defined [as a fairness test]." Id. at 201.); Dijulio v.
Digicon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 963, 965-66 (D. Md. 1971) (in securities action, "plaintiffs must
satisfy the venue requirements, both statutory and constitutional," id. at 965; court defines
latter in terms of fair play and substantial justice); cf. Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366
F. Supp. 559, 567-68 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (in securities action, venue and personal jurisdiction
limited by due process). But see, e.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156-57 (Ist Cir. 1978)
(suggesting territorial limits on federal courts are within congressional discretion), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d
1, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S.
527 (1980); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912-14 (D. Md. 1971) (dictum) (same); cf.
note 82 supra (when speaking strictly of federal territorial jurisdiction, authorities downplay
role of due process); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979) (same,
although leaving open issue of venue's constitutional aspect). See also note 132 infra.
I later contend that the cases adopting as federal common law the due-process limits
on state-court jurisdiction, see note 88 supra, are, in effect, applying this constitutional
aspect of venue. See text accompanying notes 130-33 infra. See also note 116 supra; note 133
infra.
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very demanding. Moreover, the restrictiveness of the jurisdictional
and statutory venue schemes now in place, as well as the permissiveness of the provisions for transfer of venue, means that the
requirement has little role to play in current practice. However,
several commentators have explored this constitutional restraint
on the federal courts."'
Professor G. W. Foster, Jr.,"9 argued
that a venue-like concept required the particular forum to be a
reasonable one. "Thus the imposition of an unreasonable choice
of districts within the system should raise fifth amendment due
process considerations." 120 He viewed those considerations as
somewhat analogous to the standard for territorial jurisdiction of
state courts under the fourteenth amendment. Professor Gerald
Abraham 121 earlier had made a somewhat different suggestion.
He argued that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
directly restrained the jurisdictional reach of the federal courts.
That restraint was similar to the fourteenth amendment limitation, which he viewed roughly in terms of reasonableness. We
protect a defendant against state-court jurisdiction "considered so
unfair to him as to offend the 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice' embodied in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Might it not also be unfair to force him
to litigate in the federal court across the street?" 122

11 Admittedly, some maintain that there is no constitutional restraint at all. E.g., Seidelson, supra note 105, at 82, 88; cf. Seidelson, Jurisdictionover Nonresident Defendants: Beyond
"Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DUQ. U.L. REv. 221, 251-52 (1968) (extremely lax view of due-process restraints on state-court jurisdiction). Compare
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 5, Comment b (1942) (no constitutional restraint), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) (possibly
some constitutional restraint) [§ 4].
An argument against the existence of constitutional restraint may lie in the assertion
that even for routine litigation Congress could convert the whole country into a single
district, with the federal court sitting in one place. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 9-10
(D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
However, that assertion may be false. Moreover, even a complete lack of constraint on
congressional establishment of trial courts would not necessarily imply the absence of constitutional restraint on venue among the currently existing district courts. See generally C.
WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 10 (congressional control of jurisdiction); 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E: COOPER, supra note 91, § 3508 (specialized federal courts).
19 Foster, supra note 82, at 28-38.
12o Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
121 Abraham, supra note 84, at 533-36; cf. Seeburger, The Federal Long-Arm: The Uses of
Diversity, or Tain't So, McGee, 10 IND. L. REv. 480, 482 n. 11, 505-06 (1977) (limiting similar
argument to diversity cases).
11 Abraham, supra note 84, at 533-34.
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Thus, the authorities 12. are uncertain whether this constitutional restraint on the federal courts arises from concerns of territorial jurisdiction or of venue. This uncertainty is a symptom of
yet another link between the two doctrines-indeed the key link
that reveals the route to reformulation.
d. Reformulation. The cases that developed the due-process
limits on state courts show that territorial jurisdiction involves
cumulative tests of power and reasonableness. And the foregoing
discussion suggests that federal venue comprises notions of both
constitutional "fairness" and mere "convenience." It is by now obvious that the overlap between the doctrines falls mainly in the
middle zone of reasonableness and fairness. This overlap accounts
in part for the common history of jurisdiction and venue and for
their similarity of purposes. Finally, this overlap prompts the critical step to reformulation: recognizing that the reasonableness
component of state-court jurisdiction and the fairness aspect of
federal venue are one and the same constitutional concept.' 24
I propose to act upon this identity by distilling the existing
four notions into three conceptual receptacles, a structure that
will prove useful in both federal and state settings. First, there is
pure territorial jurisdiction, the constitutional requirement that
the sovereign have power over the target of the action. Although
this same concept applies to federal and state courts, federal power obviously reaches much farther than state power. Second, there
is mere venue, which concerns at a nonconstitutional level the
convenient, efficient, or otherwise desirable distribution of judicial
business on a geographic basis. The federal and state sovereigns
might make different decisions regarding that distribution. Third,
there is a new concept, derived from both jurisdiction and venue,
that addresses the reasonableness or fairness of the forum district
or state. In awareness of its mixed parentage and in hope of proceeding without old conceptual baggage, I propose "forumreasonableness" 125 as a name for this due-process requirement. I
submit that recognition of these three separate concepts is the
rational denouement of the grand themes: the vicissitudes of the
'23The

cases exhibit the same uncertainty as the commentators. Of the cases cited for

support in note 117 supra, the Diulio case looked to venue, but Kipperman and Oxford First

spoke in terms of jurisdiction.
124 On differences in the application of the reasonableness test in federal and state settings, see text accompanying note 202 infra.
123 For a related concept, Professor Ehrenzweig suggested the term "forum conveniens."

Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 292; see text accompanying note 142 infra.
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contesting standards of power and reasonableness in jurisdiction,
and the uneasy and shifting relationship of jurisdiction and
venue.
The operation of these concepts in federal court may be
readily seen. Pure jurisdiction requires only minimum contacts
with the United States as a source of power, accounting for the
axiom that the fifth amendment imposes no impediment to
nationwide service. ' Congress may utilize mere venue to distribute the federal judicial business, for example, by restricting the
place of suit against national banks if it so chooses.'
Nevertheless, the permissiveness of pure jurisdiction and the malleability of
mere venue do not mean a federal action may lie anywhere-the
constitutional requirement of forum-reasonableness demands that
the particular district be fundamentally fair in light of all the interests of the public and the parties concerning the litigation. I
believe this fresh way of looking at an old subject does much to
clarify current law and to facilitate the reform of that law.
As an example of the clarification of current law, consider
the common application of state jurisdictional law in federal court
pursuant to federal rule 4(e).'2 8 Concerns regarding federal
power are certainly not critical here. Applying state law usually ensures satisfaction of the requirement of forum-reasonableness.
But primarily the incorporation of state restrictions serves the
purposes of mere venue in federal court. Indeed, much of the
confusion inherent in my earlier description of the "territorial
jurisdiction" of federal courts stemmed from using the accepted
language of jurisdiction to discuss what is essentially a venue concept. The confusion dissipates upon the realization that by narrowing the choice of forum, Congress and its rulemaker are only
distributing the federal judicial business, whether they employ
words of jurisdiction or of venue. Federal rule 4(e) is thus a merevenue provision.'2 9
Next consider the problem of a corporation served within
the state pursuant to federal rule 4(d)(3) on a federally created
2' See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
127

See text accompanying note 113 supra; Nifong, Diversificationand Sophistication of Bank-

ing Services and Exclusive Venue Privilege on a Collision Course, 8 FLA. S-r. U.L. REv. 209
(1980); cf. Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th Cir.
1973) (rejecting constitutional attack made on grounds of over-restrictiveness).
128 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e); see note 86 and accompanying text supra.
129 In this Article, I am proposing a theoretical framework. I am not suggesting how
courts should construe terms such as 'Jurisdiction" and "venue" already embodied in, say,
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) or 82.
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claim. 301 Federal law governs territorial authority to adjudicate,
but what is that federal law? Amidst confusion emerges the most
widely accepted view, under which the court adopts as federal law
the due-process limits on state-court jurisdiction. Confusion further surrounds the reason for so doing. The court might do so
"because the Fourteenth Amendment requires it, or because the
Fifth Amendment requires it, or because venue statutes require it,
or because the Court merely assumes that something requires
it." 1I The relevance of the due-process limit on state power is
indeed mystifying, at least in federal court on a federally created
claim and in the absence of clear compulsion by Constitution, statute, or rule. I attribute the accepted view to the federal judges'
desiring a reasonableness test, finding it in the due-process limits
on state courts, and then importing the power test too because the
prevailing concept of jurisdiction lumps reasonableness and power
together. I believe that the clarity of the reformulation reveals an
alternative in the search for the federal law: the court would apply the obligatory but easily satisfied test of federal power, and
rely on the existing requirement of forum-reasonableness as the
means for restricting reach. Hence, the court would ask whether
it was reasonable to hear this case against this corporation in this
particular district. This resembles what the courts are doing and
in fact may be exactly what they are trying to do, 3 2 but the suggested approach would nicely avoid the anomaly of applying a
power test geared to state courts. 3
130FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3); see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
"I First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736 (E.D. Tenn.
1962).
132See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 424 n.19 (9th Cir.
1977); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1284 (D.N.J. 1980)
(dictum). Although the leading cases have invoked InternationalShoe, they did so at a time
when courts interpreted that opinion as imposing only a reasonableness test. See, e.g.,
Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1968) (equating International Shoe
with basic principles of fairness); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212
F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) (same). Compare Abraham, supra note 84, at 534-35 (suggesting federal courts may invoke International Shoe in attempt to apply fifth amendment
reasonableness test), with Note, CorporateAmenability to Process in the Federal Courts: State or
FederalJurisdictionalStandards?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1131, 1143-45 (1964) (suggesting federal
courts may invoke InternationalShoe for its power aspect).

On the other hand, the misconception that International Shoe turned solely on power
was the source of confusion in the First Flight school of thought discussed in note 88 supra.
If the only issue were power, then it would become logical to require only minimum contacts with the United States, as those authorities did. Similarly, the tendency to ignore the
separate concept of forum-reasonableness explains the misleading statements in the Stafford-type authorities cited in note 82 supra and the Driver-type cases cited in note 117 supra.
" This idea that state lines are essentially irrelevant, other than for regulating the place
of service, also clarifies the operation of the 100-mile bulge provision of FED. R. Civ. P.
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The reformulation also facilitates reform of the currently
clumsy federal scheme, primarily by clarifying the key concepts
through isolation. As I shall detail in Subsection 2, the reformulation starkly exposes the relative irrelevance of pure jurisdiction
and the relative insignificance of mere venue in the federal system. Reform should sink those two concepts to their rightful status. Federal power is neither a relevant concern within the nation
nor an appropriate tool for distributing judicial business around
the country; Congress should therefore authorize the exercise of
jurisdiction to the extraterritorial limits imposed on the United
States as a whole. Congress should further eliminate most of the
current venue provisions, using the concept only selectively to refine the distribution of judicial business; venue is the appropriate
tool for narrowing the choice of forum on a subconstitutional
level. Thus, more of the task of fairly controlling selection among
federal courts should fall to forum-reasonableness. Congress
could specify forum-reasonableness in a provision siting each case
where a substantial part of the events in suit had occurred or
some other defined connections existed. Or the courts could ensure the reasonableness of the forum, or even seek the most convenient venue, by using transfer provisions.
Reassuringly, the projected destination of this federal reform
is quite close to the proposals of Professors Barrett and Currie.
Both sought to extend the courts' reach while siting each action in
a reasonably convenient forum. Barrett would do this by squeez-

4(f). The most progressive of the current views holds that federal law governs territorial
authority to adjudicate when there is proper service in the bulge, and this federal law
embodies the due-process limits on the hypothetical state consisting of the forum state plus
the bulge. See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1979). The better
approach would apply as that federal law the easily satisfied test of federal power and
the requirement of forum-reasonableness; this would reduce the function of the bulge
contour to merely defining the permissible place of service. See Kaplan, Amendments of the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (1), 77 HARV. L. REv. 601, 633 n.136 (1964); f.
Note, The Limits of FederalDiversity Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 268, 294-97 (1980) (requiring only minimum contacts
with United States); Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone-FederalLong-Arm Jurisdictionand
Amenability to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 4(f) Bulge Service of Process: Sprow v. Hartford
Insurance Co., 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 685 (1980) (similar).
Problems of asserting additional claims, see, e.g., Hallin v. C.A. l!earson, Inc., 34
F.R.D. 499 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (cross-claim between interpleaded parties), should also turn on
the forum-reasonableness concept. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 9]; note 236 infra. Consider also the possibility that the ancillary venue concept, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 9, at 24, should expand to dispense in
appropriate circumstances with all provisions within the reformulation's broad definition of
mere venue.
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ing current concepts into a venue mold; Currie chose a jurisdiction mold. They thereby deformed those concepts, incurring the
disadvantages I have mentioned. Nevertheless, the soundness of
their proposals is evident in the perception that both essentially
sought to abolish pure jurisdiction, to downplay mere venue, and
to build primarily on forum-reasonableness. It is cleaner to do so
straightforwardly.
e. Application to State Courts. The reformulation applies readily to state courts. I have shown that state-court territorial jurisdiction employs dual due-process requirements to determine
whether the state may entertain the case at all, while venue serves
the different, inferior, and subsequent purpose of determining
the place of trial within the state.'34 Indeed, the ease with which
the reformulation fits those three functions affirms its validity. On
the other hand, the foregoing dissection of the relationship between federal territorial jurisdiction and federal venue holds certain less obvious lessons concerning the interstate reach of state
courts.
Hence, in state court pure jurisdiction currently requires
minimum contacts with the state as a source of power over the
target of the action.'
The state is free to use the concept of
mere venue to distribute its judicial business among its counties or
other divisions.'36 And by virtue of the forum-reasonableness requirement, the state's entertaining the litigation must accord with
fair play and substantial justice.3 7
' See Currie, supra note 107, at 300. But cf. note 137 infra (explaining that current
distinctions are not entirely free of confusion).
,35 See text accompanying note 68 supra.

See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 82, § 12.3.
See text accompanying note 69 supra.
"The fourteenth amendment cases have not produced so refined an analysis that inquiry has been made into the reasonableness of a particular venue within a given state
system of courts." Foster, supra note 82, at 37. For this reason, the relationship between
territorial jurisdiction and venue is not as confused in the state setting as in the federal
setting.
However, some states have introduced a note of confusion by tying together service of
process and venue, as by limiting effective service to the county of venue. See Stevens,
"'
137

Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49

MICH.

L. REv. 307, 326-27 (1951). This is

analogous to the current use of the power concept to restrict choice of forum in the federal courts, as in the incorporation of state jurisdictional limits by FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e). See
text accompanying notes 128-29 supra. Both are misguided uses of jurisdiction to do the
work of venue. "Every state should have a clear and unequivocal statute providing for
service anywhere in the state in any action filed anywhere in the state." Stevens, supra, at
327.
Confusion also results from failure to recognize that a state's self-imposed limitations
on jurisdictional reach are really rules of interstate venue. See text accompanying notes
137-41 infra.
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This structure clarifies by recognizing that self-imposed
limitations on the state's jurisdictional reach are really rules of
venue. Consider long-arm statutes. We tend to classify them as
jurisdictional, because historically they acted to extend the state's
reach. But insofar as they fall short of the constitutional limits on
that reach, they act as venue restrictions. So does forum non conveniens. Primarily aimed at the convenient, efficient, or otherwise
desirable distribution of judicial business-albeit on an interstate
level-such state restrictions serve virtually the same purposes as
federal venue provisions. Such interstate restrictions also have
much in common with intrastate venue, and little in common with
the constitutional requirements of pure jurisdiction and forumreasonableness.
Realization of the relative inappositeness of pure jurisdiction
and the subordinate nature of mere venue provides the stimulus
for reform, as Subsection 2 details. First, when viewed in isolation,
power appears ultimately as a senseless concern, at least on an
intranational level. Congressional abolition of pure jurisdiction is
probably not feasible, but this requirement might wither away as
the Supreme Court reawakens in the distant future. Second, distribution of judicial business around the state by use of the venue
concept is primarily a state concern, although the states could
surely improve on their current performance.'
In the idealized
future, a state might even routinely utilize venue on an interstate
level to decide in certain cases that no court within the state was
suitable and that proper venue lay elsewhere; the states could do
so through the legislative enactment of "short-arm statutes" 139 or
the judicial invocation of forum non conveniens. 4 °1 We could
131See generally Stevens, supra note 137.
'" See Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 112-13; cf. Louis, supra note 89, at 431-32 (noting
some pressures on states to expand reach).
An even less likely legislative route to this goal would be a federal statute imposing
venue rules or transfer provisions on the state courts. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 313;
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lanyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUm. L. Rav. 1,
22-24 (1945); Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in Conflict of Laws: Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "TransientJurisdiction," 9 J. PuB. L. 313, 319-20 (1960). But note that the
federal statute treating national-bank venue, see note 113 and accompanying text supra, has
a provision dictating venue in state court.
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court were to tighten up the constitutional requirement
of forum-reasonableness, this could eventually lead to hearing the case in the most convenient forum. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 82, § 12.30, at 662-63.
110See note 116 supra; cf. Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 600, 606 n.35 (1977) (noting some disadvantages
of forum non conveniens route).
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thus approach the goal of a coherent national court system with

the common objective of the convenient administration of
justice.'4 ' Third, forum-reasonableness will always act as a floor
to ensure that hearing the case in the state is fundamentally fair
in light of all the interests in the litigation. This constitutional
concern might even extend to the location of the particular courthouse within the bigger states, but such extension lies in the misty
future if anywhere.
Also reassuringly, this picture of the future generally conforms to the proposals of others. For example, Professor Ehrenzweig sketched a scheme of "interstate venue" in which power was
of little concern and the states exercised self-restraint to distribute
judicial business throughout the nation on the basis of
convenience.'4 2 Moreover, my picture of the state courts' future
conforms closely to my picture for federal district courts: the demise of pure territorial jurisdiction at least on the intranational
scene, the selective use of mere venue to narrow the geographic
choice of forum on a subconstitutional level, and the emergence
of the separate constitutional concept of forum-reasonableness.' 4
2. Implications of the Reformulation
Having reformulated the relationship of territorial jurisdiction and venue, and having generalized the reformulation's application to federal and state courts, I now intend to draw some
specific lessons and to suggest some reforms in connection with
each of the three components of the reformulated conceptual
structure. Then I shall cover a couple of collateral implications of
the reformulation. Here, even more so than heretofore, elusive
brevity counsels me to favor pronouncing conclusions over
arguing toward them and refining them.
"'

See Hazard, supra note 81, at 712, 720.

See Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 108, 111-13 ("We would thus arrive at a law of
interstate venue which would permit suit primarily in the state of the defendant's domicile,
either individual or corporate, but also include venues based on defendant's activities related to the cause of action and, in certain cases, on the plaintiff's domicile." Id. at 11112.); Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 312-14; note 125 supra. See also World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 n.21 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); F. JAMES & G.
142

supra note 82, § 12.30; Foster, Place of Trial-InterstateApplication of Intrastate
Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. REV. 41 (1930); Hazard, supra note 81, at 711-12, 720;
HAZARD,

Jackson, supra note 139, at 23-24, 30-33; Schlesinger, supra note 139, at 322-25.
1'
Furthermore, both pictures are similar to how a state or country distributes judicial
business within its boundaries, see Jackson, supra note 139, at 24 n.94; Schlesinger, supra
note 139, at 318-19, 323, and even to how some other countries distribute judicial business
internationally, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 106-07, 113.
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a. PureJurisdiction.Currently, the foundation of pure territorial jurisdiction is power: the sovereign must have power over the
target of the action. 44 Quite frankly, it seems almost incredible
that the Supreme Court has recently resurrected pure
jurisdiction.' 41 But for now we must relearn to apply the power
test and renew the attack upon it. The proposed theoretical
framework conceptually isolates pure jurisdiction and thus exposes the extent of its senselessness. I leave to brief allusion in the
margin the familiar arguments against the power test.'46 Here I
shall discuss only one special difficulty that the process of reformulation has suggested.
'
145

See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
But see Louis, supra note 89. For a possible socio-political explanation, see Kalo, supra

note 9, at 1193-94.
146 Power is a conceptual quagmire that begets quagmires like the traditional categorization of actions, see text accompanying notes 40-41 & 65-67 supra, among others, see, e.g.,
notes 76 & 81 supra. It also leads to barren conceptualism, epitomized by the Court's
wooden approach in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), its revival of fictional consent in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977), and its rejection of the direct-action
analogy in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1980). The power test and its trappings
are just too complicated and rarefied to survive. See Hazard, supra note 9, at 243.
Power has weak theoretical underpinnings. The emptiness of the Pennoyer rationale of
exclusive jurisdiction has long been obvious. See id. at 265-68, 277-81. Sovereignty concerns
are at least questionable. See text accompanying notes 161-64 infra. Nor do fairness concerns adequately explain the power test; any test that is sometimes blindly pro-defendant
because it ignores the interests of others, and sometimes merely blind because its sterile
notion of contacts can ignore even the actual defendant's interests, ill serves fairness. Certainly the forum-reasonableness concept better handles fairness. See note 201 and accompanying text infra. So the test requiring power over the target of the action has little
justification, and thus its conceptual superstructure serves principally to obscure the real
concerns involved in determining rights and duties of persons. See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. Rlv. 1121, 1135-36, 1165
(1966).
The power concept is not sufficiently supple to take adequate account of the relation
of the claim to the forum contacts, or to make the sound distinction between specific and
general jurisdiction. See id. at 1136. Also, this concept fails to promote the needed adjustments of expanding specific jurisdiction and contracting general jurisdiction. See id. at
1164, 1177-79.
The power idea is incapable of adjusting to changes in technology or society. See text
accompanying notes 205-07 infra. In the past, courts had to use artificial means to stretch
power in pursuit of corporations, motorists, and others. See Carrington & Martin, supra
note 44, at 228-30; Hazard, supra note 9, at 272-75. Old bases of power persist in the face
of evolving notions of fairness. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 314. The future of power
can hold only more of the same.
Finally, for all these reasons the power test simply gives the wrong answers. It allows
jurisdiction where none should exist, see, e.g., note 74 and accompanying text supra, and
stands in the way where jurisdiction would be perfectly appropriate or even necessary, see,
e.g., note 90 supra. Supplementing the power test with the reasonableness test will solve
only half of this problem. In short, power should be neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition for adjudication.
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"Power" no longer has an ascertainable meaning. Upon shifting from physical power to metaphorical power, 4 the Supreme
Court shattered all hope of restraining the definition of that
word. Today we cannot attempt to define it without introducing
elements of reasonableness. For example, in delineating power,
we look for such minimum contacts as make it reasonable to
require the defendant to defend. "8 Thus we permit a state to
reach the defendant who has purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the state. 49 We sometimes stretch power to reach the defendant who has engaged in
voluntary out-of-state activities with reasonably foreseeable in-state
effects. 50 We then wonder about the similar defendant who has
engaged in multistate activities, but who could not have foreseen
consequences occurring in the forum state.' 5 ' This sequence
demonstrates that looking at the reasonableness of requiring the
defendant to defend inevitably entails looking at the relevant interests of others. The test truly becomes whether it is "reasonable
to exercise power." Reasonableness therefore precedes the power
issue and so should ultimately consume it.
The Supreme Court has evidenced this slippage in several
ways. First, consider closely its general formulae for power: the
requirement of minimum contacts "will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State"; 152 the defendant must engage in "purposeful activity related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction
fair, just, or reasonable"; -s and "an essential criterion in all cases
147

See text accompanying notes 38 & 68 supra.

"' See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
149 See text accompanying note 42 supra.

1-' See Foster, supra note 82, at 33; cf. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (independent middleman). On which side of
the line Gray would fall, after applying the currently prevailing power test, is open to
question. See Siegel, "Longarm"JurisdictionPinched By High Court, But Not Broken, Nat'l L.J.,

March 17, 1980, at 18, col. 4; Sorg, World-Wide Volkswagen: Has the United States Supreme
Court Taken the Illinois Civil Practice Act Section 17-1(b) Out of the Gray Zone?, 1980 S. IL..

U.L.J. 137, 143-44. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297-98 (1980), and Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction exists),
with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 306-07 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), and Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.) (no jurisdiction), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 983 (1978). Whatever the answer, this confusion over Gray shows the arbitrariness
of a dividing line based on power.
151 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1172-73.
152 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
M5Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980).
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is whether the 'quality and nature' of the defendant's activity is
such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his
defense in that State." 1'4 Attempts to define power seem to be its
undoing. Second, certain dicta expose the weak points in the definitional line, where reasonableness has infiltrated. As examples I
cite the Court's recent references to power in some circumstances
over a defendant who has merely derived benefits from the
forum state "I or caused in-state effects, 56 and power over a defendant whose "conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there." 157 I also cite the Court's repeated surrender to the urge
to consider, and then discount, interests of the public and the
plaintiff, even though the Court insists that these are irrelevant
once it finds power to be lacking. 5 Third, the Court's holdings
reveal the arbitrariness of the bounds of power. Common sense
suggests that the power test has lingered too long when the
majority finds the state's contacts with nonresident automobile
dealers inadequate to compose that mystical thing called power,
and then the dissent just as convincingly demonstrates the adequacy of those contacts.159 Guesswork and fiat based on inklings
of reasonableness should yield to candor and the reasonableness
60
test.
At the very least, the Supreme Court or Congress should relax the requirement of pure jurisdiction by redefining it in closer
accordance with "sovereignty" and "the principles of interstatc
federalism." '6' However, I do not believe any such reform could
" Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 319 (1945)).
' World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94-96 (1978).
'16 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96-98 (1978).
117 World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977); cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 & n.18 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for direct application of reasonableness test).
' See notes 54 & 58 supra.
...Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-99 (1980),
with id. at 305-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Going beyond the recent Supreme Court cases, one could repeatedly make the point
that the power test inevitably collapses into the reasonableness test. However, I shall only
recall how reasonableness supplants power by fixing the ultimate limits on the reification
process, see note 76 and accompanying text supra, and on the categorization process, see
note 81 and accompanying text supra.
' World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980); see text
accompanying notes 62 & 64 supra; cf. Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: PersonalJurisdiction After
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go far enough. First, I see no way to meet the challenge of redefinition so as to avoid the problems of the current minimumcontacts approach. Second, I question whether sovereignty
notions make much sense for territorial jurisdiction, especially
within a federation.162 Third, I wonder which way those notions
cut and, specifically, whether a permissive approach to state-court
jurisdiction would not better serve the cause of state
Fourth, I think that any legitimate concerns of
sovereignty.16
sovereignty and federalism that call for a restrictive approach find
adequate expression in the reasonableness test and its attention to
sovereign interests as part of the public interest.""
Accordingly, the Supreme Court or Congress should abolish
of pure jurisdiction and, with it, the power test and
concept
the
the traditional categorization of proceedings. Constitutional hisShaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 861, 882-90 (1978) (alternative redefinition).
It is unclear how any jurisdictional test devoted to sovereignty and federalism concerns would derive from the due process clause, which usually focuses on fairness to the
defendant. See Abraham, supra note 84, at 532-33; Rheinstein, The ConstitutionalBases of
Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. R~v. 775, 795-96, 816-17 (1955); cf Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185, 185-203 (1976) (discussing analogous problem regarding choice of law). But see Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. Iu. L.F. 533, 534-35; Hazard, supra note 9, at 270
& n.102; cf. Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 94, 95-97 (1976) (choice of law). This cloudiness would thicken as the
separate due-process concept of forum-reasonableness absorbed all fairness considerations.
Perhaps it would be neater to draw any jurisdictional test protecting sovereignty and federalism from the full faith and credit clause, see Rheinstein, supra; but see Ehrenzweig, supra
note 1, at 108 (questioning applicability of full faith and credit clause), or better yet from
the structure of the Constitution, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 293 (1980) ("a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment"). At any rate, the cloudy source of sovereignty
and federalism concerns predictably leads to confusion over their meaning and even doubt
of their existence.
162 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311-12 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 112; note 217 infra. But see Hazard, supra
note 9, at 245-48. Professor Hazard, finding sovereignty concerns extant even among states
that are not independent, would protect those concerns by his all-purpose requirement of
"minimum contacts between the forum and the transaction in litigation." Id. at 281.
Obviously, sovereignty notions make more sense on the international level. However,
the problems of the current power test and the sufficiency of the forum-reasonableness
requirement argue for abolishing the concept of pure jurisdiction even for international
use. See note 143 supra.
'" See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 82, § 12.30, at 662 ("It is paradoxical but true
that the theory of state sovereignty, in elevating the position of the states individually to
something like that of independent nations, has had the effect of constricting the judicial
authority of the state court systems taken as a whole."); Hazard, supra note 81, at 712 n.2,
720.
164 See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 114-16 (1980).
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tory should thus repeat itself, by reproducing Mullane's rejection
65
of power in favor of sole reliance on forum-reasonableness.'
b. Mere Venue. This broad concept encompasses all
subconstitutional,'6 geographic restrictions on selection of forum,
67
including (1) state provisions regarding venue within the state,
(2) exercises of self-restraint by the states, which distribute judicial
business on an interstate level, 68 (3) federal venue provisions,
embracing even those in the form of restrictions on service of
process,) 9 and (4) self-restraint on the international level. 7 ° Such
a broad definition of venue is novel. In federal courts, the popular definition equates venue to those rules of territorial authority
to adjudicate not linked to service provisions. 7 ' This arbitrary
line is devoid of theoretical and practical significance. In state
courts, on the other hand, the popular definition limits venue to
intrastate provisions. 7 2 There is hardly a need for a separate
concept to draw such an obvious distinction; yet the distinction
has its theoretical difficulties, because an intrastate provision that
is impossible to satisfy anywhere within the state acts as an interstate restriction. A leading alternative to this pair of definitions
would limit venue to those territorial rules that do not constitute
grounds for collateral attack. However, this line puts the cart before the horse by defining in terms of consequences; selecting one
consequence as a basis for definition might provide a useless or
misleading terminology with respect to other consequences; and
this particular consequence increasingly fails to provide definition
as relief from judgment becomes a more fluid procedure dependent on the circumstances of the attack.'73 Moreover, these and
165 See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
'66

Here and elsewhere in this Article, such an expression refers to any level below the

Federal Constitution. Thus, a state may choose to insert venue provisions in its own constitution.
167 See notes 136-38 and accompanying text supra; note 143 supra.
1'6 See text accompanying notes 137-41 supra.
i69 See text accompanying notes 128-33 supra.
170 See note 143 supra; cf. note 116 supra (federal forum non conveniens).
17' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment h (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978)
[§ 4]; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1976) (arguably drawing such a distinction). But see text
accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
172 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment h (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978)
[§ 4]. But see text accompanying notes 137-41 supra. Simply distinguishing when appropriate between intrastate venue and interstate venue would recognize their similarities as well
as their differences.
17" See text accompanying notes 216-24 infra. The Restatement Second had to avoid using
this definition based on collateral attack, because such a definition is inconsistent with the
Restatement Second's fluid approach to relief from judgment. See text accompanying note
239 infra.
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other conceivable definitions that would distinguish venue from
nonconstitutional territorial jurisdiction all make nonsensical distinctions in the border zone where they encounter rules of "fraud
and force" 114 and immunity from service of process, 17 5 the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 7 6 door-closing statutes,'" and the
National Bank Act.'"" Any line drawn down the middle of a unitary concept will prove unsatisfying in the gray zone. Accordingly,
I propose the broad view as a more sensible definition and a
fruitful way of thinking about the subject: mere venue in both
federal and state courts encompasses all geographic provisions on
which the legislatures and the courts can freely work reform in
pursuit of an integrated scheme for the convenient, efficient, or
otherwise desirable distribution of judicial business.
Because it employs a more sensible terminology, the proposed framework clarifies troubling conceptual distinctions. Mere
venue, like pure territorial jurisdiction and forum-reasonableness,
confines the place of litigation; but mere venue, unlike the other
two, does not arise from the Federal Constitution. Consider the
difference between these three concepts and subject-matter jurisdiction. The latter concerns the court's authority to adjudicate
particular types of proceedings grouped in essentially nongeographic terms; pure territorial jurisdiction, forum-reasonableness,
and mere venue dictate where, if anywhere, that authority is exercisable within the court system. In particular, some commentators observe that venue and subject-matter jurisdiction can be difficult to distinguish: Where, for example, does the local-action
doctrine fall? "I In my view, it is a rule of venue. Admittedly,
confusion may surround the proper procedure for raising that
issue and the consequences of raising or failing to raise it.10 But
even if we resolved these issues much as we do for subject-matter
jurisdiction, reclassifying the local-action doctrine as jurisdictional
would be conclusory and would only hinder analysis. Instead of
pigeonholing, we should directly face these questions of procedure, res judicata, waiver, and default, recognizing that the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82 (1971).
See id. § 83.
1
See note 116 supra.
177 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 46, at 199.
171 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976); see notes 113, 127 & 139 supra.
179 See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, D. LoujsELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 96, § 43, at 131-32; F.
174

See

175

JAMES & G.

HAZARD, supra note 82, § 12.1, at 603-04. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 7, Comment h (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 4].
See 15 C. WRITRr, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, supra note 91, § 3822, at 128-29.

JUDGMENTS
'0

OF

450

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:411

answers may vary with the nature and importance of the particular venue rule under examination."'
By so consolidating and isolating mere venue, the proposed
framework exposes that concept's relative insignificance as well as
its malleability. The legislatures and the courts should freely rework venue, using it only to refine the distribution of judicial
business in pursuit of convenience, efficiency, and other such
goals.' 2 As an ideal first step, legislatures should wipe clean the
venue slate and begin anew. For example, they should discard the
confusing local-action doctrine 18' and the patchwork of special
venue statutes.8 4 Any new provisions narrowing the choice of
forum 85 should emerge clearly cast in venue language, not buried
in service or notice provisions. However, some of the past is worth
continuing. Courts probably should still play a role in the venue
scheme through transfer provisions ...
and the doctrine of forum
181See note 239 and accompanying text infra. A similar example would be territorial

jurisdiction over things. This too is distinct from subject-matter jurisdiction, even though
there is confusion over the procedure for raising it and the consequences of raising or
failing to raise it. Compare RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 9-10 (1942), with RFSTATEMIENT
(SECOND) OFJuDMENTS § 13 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 10], and id. § 15 (Tent. Draft No.
6, 1979) [§ 12]. See also id., Introductory Note to ch. 2, at 15-16 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978);
id. § 14, Comment b [§ 11]; 1978 ALI PROCEEDINGS 146.
182 I leave to later the possible constraint of the Erie doctrine. See text accompanying
notes 221-24 infra. Conceivably, Congress might choose to conform federal venue to statecourt access, in the pursuit of easy application. See Abraham, supra note 84, at 535 n.95.
'a' See Currie, supranote 107, at 305 n.441. See also 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.14212]
(2d ed. 1980).
"I See ALI STUDY, supra note 82, at 219, 498; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 85, at
1111; Barrett, supra note 92, at 633-35; Stevens, supra note 137.
1" For some preliminary ideas, see notes 105 & 107 and accompanying text supra, and
also notes 138 & 142 supra.
"8 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 85, at 1140-41; notes 99, 105, 107, 114-16 & 139
supra. But see Currie, supra note 107, at 309 ("only excuse for transfer [provisions] or [their]
harsh predecessor, forum non conveniens, was the inexcusable overbreadth of the venue
and personal-jurisdiction laws"); Kitch, supra note 114, at 142 ("under well drawn venue
code," burdens of transfer procedure would outweigh benefits). Congress should, however,
amend the federal transfer provisions at least by eliminating the "where it might have been
brought" language from 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976), see C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 44, at
189, possibly by eliminating the equivalent language from 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976), see
Currie, supra note 107, at 307-08, and probably by further restricting appealability and
reviewability, see Barrett, supra note 92, at 631-32; Currie, supra note 107, at 309-10.
We could indeed manage in the federal courts with only the present transfer provisions and the forum-reasonableness requirement. Cf. Seidelson, supra note 105, at 100
(proposal to eliminate venue restrictions). Presumably, transfer from a reasonable forum to
a more convenient federal forum would be under § 1404(a) and would entail application
of transferor law, while any transfer from an unreasonable forum would be under
§ 1406(a) with application of transferee law but with tolling of the statute of limitations. See
generally Note, Choice of Law in FederalCourt After Transfer of Venue, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 149
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non conveniens. ' Initially, then, more permissive venue in the
federal system 88 and more restrictive interstate venue among the
state courts 89 are desirable. Ultimately, perhaps, a progressively
more restrictive approach on both federal and state levels might
begin to realize in part the dream of allocating each case to the
one right court, which would then apply local law.' 90
c. Forum-Reasonableness. The Constitution requires that the
forum be a reasonable one.' 9 ' This flexible approach promises
several benefits.
First, this test takes into account all interests in the litigation,
which I have roughly catalogued as those of the public, the plaintiff, and the defendant. I leave the task of refining the technique
of analyzing and balancing these interests to some excellent studies that precede me on the workings of the reasonableness test.' 92
In passing I note my preference for a comprehensive approach,
considering both the "substantive interests" chronicled by Profes' and the concerns of Professors von
sors Carrington and Martin 93
Mehren and Trautman for "the relationship of the parties and of
the controversy to the forum" and "other litigational and enforcement considerations." ' Such comprehensiveness has a number
of implications: (1) no constitutional clauses other than due pro(1977). Any proposal of this scope happens to obviate the need to eliminate the "where it
might have been brought" language. However, federal courts would frequently be applying
nonlocal law, unless the forum-reasonableness requirement tightened up or either Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), or Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941), ceased to govern. Incidentally, an analogous approach for state courts is conceivable. See notes 139-42 supra.
It is interesting to note that if in one of the ways just mentioned we overcame the
problem of having to apply transferor law, and if we eliminated forum-reasonableness as a
basis for relief from default judgments, see text accompanying note 217 infra, we could
manage with a scheme founded solely on a transfer mechanism. Forum-reasonableness
would effectively drop out of the picture.
See notes 116, 140 & 142 supra.
See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
ISO See text accompanying notes 138-43 supra.
187
188

190 See Ehrenzweig, Ehrenzweig in Reply, 9 J. PUB. L. 328, 328 (1960); Ehrenzweig, supra
note 9, at 292; Jackson, supra note 139, at 23; Kalo, supra note 9, at 1194; Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. R~v. 657, 663-64 (1959); cf. note 139 supra (similar
result by tightening up forum-reasonableness requirement); note 200 and accompanying
text infra (effect of choice of law on forum restrictions). But see Currie, supra note 107, at
307 ("It would be mellow to try every action in the most convenient forum, But deciding
where that forum is costs altogether too much time and money.").
19' See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
192 E.g., Smit, supra note 140, at 607-14; Woods, supra note 161, at 890-98; works cited
notes 193-94 infra.
"' Carrington & Martin, supra note 44.
1v on Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1166.

452

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:411

cess need become directly involved in limiting territorial authority
to adjudicate, because the policies behind such provisions as the
first amendment' 95 and the commerce clause 196 enter into the
due-process balance; (2) rules such as "fraud and force" "' and
immunity from service of process,'98 which in the days of the
power theory seemed to be only self-imposed limitations on jurisdictional reach, now have a constitutional underpinning;'9 9 (3) the
actualities of choice-of-law practices enter into the calculus; 2 ° and
20
(4) the balancing of interests is finally party-neutral. '

19- See Carrington & Martin, supra note 44, at 237 n.44, 239 n.55, 240-42 (state needs
greater contacts to assert jurisdiction where first amendment interests are at stake); cf.
Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 &
n.11 (D.C. 1976) ("government contacts" principle).
'96 See Carrington & Martin, supra note 44, at 234 (state jurisdiction may be more limited
where it would burden interstate commerce).
1"7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82 (1971).
'9' See id. § 83.
"9 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.25 (1977); cf. Carrington & Martin, supra
note 44, at 234-36 (constitutional core of rule against disrupting foreign trusts and estates,
"internal affairs" doctrine, and indispensable-party rule).
In deciding the reasonableness issue, a court must consider the effect of its decision
on the law applied. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 n.19
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 292; Foster, supra note 82, at
42 & n.129 (choice of law also relevant to venue). See generally Fischer, Shaffer v. Heitner:
Some Thoughts on Its Impact on the Doctrines of Choice of Law and Preclusion by Judgment, 30
CAsE W. Rss. L. Rv. 74, 93-97, 110-17 (1979); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146,
at 1128-33, 1174-77.
By the way, the reworking of constitutional authority to adjudicate that this Article
suggests might facilitate a rethinking of the similar constitutional limits on choice of law.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 49 U.S.L.W. 4071 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981). Compare Kirgis, supra
note 161, with Martin, supra note 161, Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 151 (1976), and Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872
(1980). See also Leflar, The Converging Limits of State JurisdictionalPowers, 9 J. PUB. L. 282
(1960); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587 (1978).
" The power test was erratically pro-defendant. See Kalo, supra note 9, at 1149. With
International Shoe, the pendulum swung toward the plaintiff. See id. Some proposals, e.g.,
Seidelson, supra note 105, at 85-88, now excessively favor the plaintiff. The superior
approach lies in the middle, looking at all interests without bias for the defendant or the
plaintiff but with an awareness that the parties may not be in identical positions. See
Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 110-11; cf. Kalo, supra note 9, at 1194-95 (party-neutrality may
be possible as inconvenience of distant litigation decreases in future).
The fact that the current reasonableness test is less likely to permit the plaintiff to sue
at his own home than at the defendant's home does not imply a bias for the defendant.
With the parties' interests equally weighted and with all other things equal, the defendant's
home is naturally a reasonable forum, because at the defendant's home the plaintiff's interest in having a forum aligns with the defendant's interest in defending at home.
Equivalently, no bias for the defendant lies in recognizing that he has an interest in defending at home and that elsewhere other net interests must outweigh this interest. But see
Smit, supra note 140, at 608 (plaintiff's interest in suing at home must give way because
social policy discourages litigation); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1127-28,
1147, 1167-73 (traditional bias favoring "attacked").
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Second, the same balancing test applies in federal and state
courts, although the results might differ sometimes because
different interests are on the scales. 212 For example, in federal

court the public's interests depend in part on the basis of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction and on the role of federal courts, as in
multiparty proceedings. However, often any federal court in the
country can protect many of those interests, thus reducing their
weight on the due-process scales. Similarly, the parties' interests
differ from federal court to state court. For example, a federal
court must determine the reasonableness of the district, while a
state court must inquire into the reasonableness of the state.
Thus, the parties sometimes must establish interests in relation to
different geographic areas.
Third, and very important, this test does not entail any nonfunctional categorization along the Pennoyer lines of in personam,
in rem, and quasi in rem.0 s Conceptually the test is simple; it
directly addresses the relevant concern of fairness in the broadest
sense. It surely offers "a more functional and less mechanical
methodology" 20 than the power test.
Fourth, the reasonableness test can readily adjust to advances
in communications, transportation, and other technology as well
as to social, economic, political, and philosophic changes.0 5 The
test may in effect relax as, for example, new technology lessens
the inconvenience of distant litigation. 0 6 Or it may tighten up, as
an evolving sense of reasonableness becomes more demanding.2 7
In either case, the test's flexibility will prove a virtue.
See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 n.7 (9th Cir.
1977); Foster, supra note 82, at 34-35, 37. The Supreme Court reached an analogous conclusion regarding individual and corporate defendants: the same standard governs both,
but "differences between individuals and corporations may, of course, lead to the conclusion that a given set of circumstances establishes state jurisdiction over one type of defendant but not over the other." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977).
203 See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 190, at 660-63; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
146, at 1135-36, 1164-65. Also, the reasonableness test demands none of the intellectual
gymnastics currently associated with jurisdiction by necessity. See id. at 1173-74; notes 67,
80 & 90 supra; note 231 infra.
Of course, the varying effects of the different kinds of judgment still enter into the
reasonableness consideration. See Smit, supra note 140, at 614, 626 n.101, 628 n.l 12. Also,
there is room for a functional categorization along the lines of specific and general jurisdiction. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1136; note 146 supra.
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1164.
215 See generally Kalo, supra note 9, at 1195.
See id. at 1191-92; cf. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1173 n.149 (bifurcated proceedings).
201 See notes 139 & 190 supra. In terms of balancing, the public interest in hearing the
case in the best place would become weightier. Cf. Kalo, supra note 9, at 1193-94 (possibility of increased concern for defendants).
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However, all this flexibility could also prove a curse. Perhaps
"it is clear that the issue of the place of trials is one that should be
settled by simple, formal tests."20 How should the objective of
certainty affect forum-reasonableness?
The courts could pursue certainty by narrowing their consideration to certain specified interests209 or by fashioning rules for
balancing. 210 Alternatively, legislators could attempt to specify
forum-reasonableness by statute, thus injecting a degree of workability; such provisions would look like some of today's more expansive long-arm statutes. 21' Both approaches concededly pose
obvious problems; neither has worked well in the past to reduce
uncertainty or holds much promise for the future. 2 2 Perhaps we
should learn to accept the uncertainty.
It is well to recall that forum-reasonableness is a constitutional test, for which certainty may be unattainable and indeed inappropriate. The Supreme Court surely has not yet pinned down
reasonableness. "It may be that it is not possible to do so and that
here as elsewhere in our constitutional law the Supreme Court
must depend on the good faith and good judgment of the other
courts in the American judicial System." 13
2 "The essence of due
process is that proceedings shall be fair; whether they are fair
must be a subjective judgment based on the common sense of the
judge." 12 4 Moreover, this constitutional requirement of forumreasonableness usually serves as a back-up check on venue. The
legislatures may push it farther into the background by actively
developing intelligent and workable venue rules to zero in on the
more convenient of all the reasonable fora. Finally, I stress that I
20 Kitch, supra note 114, at 141. Significantly, however, Professor Kitch was writing of
venue.
'o9 See Carrington & Martin, supra note 44, at 246-48; Smit, supra note 140, at 608-13.
210 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1167-69, 1173-75, 1177.
211 See Hazard, supra note 9, at 283; Smit, supra note 140, at 613; von Mehren & Traut-

man, supra note 146, at 1176 (discussing
PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(a)).

UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL

212 The underlying problem is that reasonableness by its very nature opposes restraints.
The best proof of this is the considerable experience of long-arm statutes degenerating
into the reasonableness test. See R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 85, at
756-61.
It would seem better to find ways to limit the resources devoted to determining this
preliminary issue, as by restricting oral testimony or reviewability, than to twist the reasoning behind the determination. Alternatively, we could simply continue to rely on the accretion of case law for the particularization of reasonableness. See Hazard, supra note 89, 66
CORNELL L. REv. at 571-72.
21 Kurland, supra note 23, at 623.
2'14Currie, supra note 161, at 577.
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am proposing nothing new in forum-reasonableness. It currently
applies in federal and state courts, and we manage with its uncertainties. Life can only become simpler if forum-reasonableness
becomes the sole constitutional test for territorial authority to adjudicate, which I do propose.
d. Bases for Relief from Judgment. The proposed theoretical

framework aids in resolving numerous policy problems throughout the subject of authority to adjudicate. As a first example, I
shall tentatively discuss the important problem of whether a defendant can obtain relief from a judgment rendered by a
territorially improper forum in which he made no appearance. I
believe that this discussion will reaffirm the soundness of the
proposed framework.
The chief policy problem underlying such relief from a default judgment is when to force the defendant to appear initially
and when to allow him later to attack the selection of forum.
Alternatively stated, the problem is how to reconcile the desire for
finality with the distaste for overstepping by courts and for
harassment of defendants. The general approach has been to
strike a compromise by allowing the defendant to attack a default
judgment for lack of 'jurisdiction," apparently because courts intuitively equate that term with requirements of special
importance.2 1'

The prevailing but arbitrary and unclear defini-

tion of 'jurisdiction" in this context includes pure jurisdiction,
forum-reasonableness, and certain mere-venue rules such as
long-arm statutes. 6
I submit that the more functional definitions of the proposed
framework yield a wiser and clearer rule of thumb: the defendant
should generally be able to attack a default judgment on the constitutional grounds of pure jurisdiction and forum-reasonableness,
but not on grounds of mere venue. I am not suggesting that my
new labels mandate new results, but better labels prompt sound
rethinking. Rethinking suggests that the defendant should have to
appear initially to raise any mere-venue defect, although of course
the law of the rendering court could specifically provide otherwise. Thus, my general rule of thumb happens to follow a conceptual boundary of the proposed framework.
2"15See Currie, supra note 107, at 304 & n.430 (citing RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7,
Comment b (1942), and noting dearth of authority that draws clear line).
216 See Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1971); Mooney Aircraft,
Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1968); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Superior

Court, 16 Ariz. App. 494, 494 P.2d 394 (1972);

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

id. §§ 7-8 (certain other mere-venue defects deemed 'Jurisdictional").

§ 5 (1942); cf.
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In the distant future, perhaps the bases for attack should
further contract. As the inconvenience of distant special appear27
ances lessens and as relief mechanisms such as transfer improve,
we may decide to disallow any attack on grounds of unreasonable
forum and thus to allow territorial attack only for lack of constitutional power. But the demise of pure jurisdiction would eliminate
the latter grounds, even for an attack on a state-court judgment.
Accordingly, we may be in transit to a regime under which the
defendant could raise territorial authority to adjudicate, at least of
the intranational variety, only by proper procedure in the original
action.
To summarize, definitional confusion undermines the current doctrine, and reasons exist for progressively contracting the
grounds for attack. This state of affairs explains, but does not
justify, any attempt to preclude attack by arbitrarily reclassifying
certain requirements as "nonjurisdictional." 218 Instead of relying
on labels to control consequences, courts should rethink the policy
problems of relief from judgment and then redelineate the
grounds for attack. Such an approach could conform to the trend
toward a fluid view of validity of judgments, a view that would
accord the bases for successful attack with the nature and importance of the alleged impropriety as well as with the circumstances
of the attack. 29 Finally, the idea that we may already be in transit
to a more restrictive doctrine illuminates the stark differences of
current opinion on the proper bases for relief from judgment.2
217 Harassment concerns would hence decrease. Fears of judicial overstepping alone

might not justify attack on forum-reasonableness grounds, as this structural concern is less
important than subject-matter jurisdiction; it is not even significant enough to prevent
early waiver by the defendant in the original action. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12. See also
text accompanying notes 161-64 supra.
28 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978) [§ 4]. But cf. id., Reporter's Note § 7, comment d at 60 ("The statutory limitations, to
the extent they are more restrictive than the Constitution, can be viewed as an expression
of a forum non conveniens policy. Under such an approach, their benefit would be available
upon seasonable claim but noncompliance with them would not result in an inevitably void
judgment.") [§ 4]. See also id. §§ 113-114 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§§ 65-66].
219See, e.g., Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 429 Pa. 177, 191, 240 A.2d 505, 513 (1967)
(plaintiff's failure to follow service statute not fatal where defaulting defendant failed "to
exercise even ordinary diligence" in objecting); text accompanying note 239 infra. But see,
e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The doctrine
of laches has never been jurisdiction creating.").
no Compare Currie, supra note 107, at 303-04 (favoring attack even for venue-like defects
in federal court), with Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 113 (disfavoring attack even for
"jurisdictional" defects in state court). Consider also this exchange, from 1978 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 117-18, during the discussion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 10]:
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e. Erie Doctrine. The proposed theoretical framework does
not by itself preclude the application of state 'jurisdictional" law
in federal court pursuant to Erie.22 1 It does, however, suggest at
least the need to rethink the current approach to this problem.
Today Erie requires a federal court, on a state-created claim and
in the absence of a federal statutory directive or rule, to apply the
state's "jurisdictional" law but not its venue provisions.222 A
seemingly better, albeit still crude, 223 approach would carry into
PROFESSOR CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT (Tex.): I have a question for
you, Professor Hazard. Assume that I have never been in Alaska in my life,
never been in anything to possibly subject me to jurisdiction in Alaska. If I
received a summons and complaint in the federal court in Alaska, is it my
privilege simply to throw it in the wastepaper basket, or am I bound to go in
and make a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of my
person?
PROFESSOR HAZARD: No, you are not required to contest it. You may
contest it.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: Pardon?
PROFESSOR HAZARD: You may contest it at that point, but you are not
required to do that.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: I can treat this simply as a nullity, all these papers that come with all the right forms? There is a very eminent treatise that
goes to many volumes that gives a contrary answer. There is also an article on
jurisdiction in the Georgia Law Review which says that you cannot ignore it.
Homer nodded on the point. I would like to know what the answer is.
PROFESSOR HAZARD: I thought the rule is that you had a constitutional
privilege to resist the enforcement of that judgment should effort be made to
enforce it in some other remote place like Texas. (Laughter) Your objection
would be to the inadequacy of notice or the lack of territorial jurisdiction in the
rendering court. If you got notice, you would not have much to talk about,
certainly under this Restatement; but if in fact it has been your misfortune
never to be in Alaska, and you had nothing to do with Alaska at all, I suppose
you would have a constitutional privilege to resist the judgment on the ground
that the rendering court lacked that essential connection with you that was required to be the base of jurisdiction. Isn't that settled law?
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: If that case ever arises, I suppose I shall have to
cite the proceedings of this meeting of the American Law Institute and Moore's
Federal Practice, which is also wrong on the subject.
2' See notes 82, 87 & 182 supra. See generally Comment, PersonalJurisdictionover Foreign
Corporations in Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 752,
765-79 (1964).
22 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 64, at 303-04, § 42, at 170. Although the popular
meaning of 'Jurisdiction" under the Erie case law is as arbitrary and unclear as usual, it
does not necessarily conform to the prevailing definition in other contexts. See, e.g., text
accompanying note 216 supra. Nevertheless, there seems to be an analogous tendency to
ignore state law on requirements arguably "nonjurisdictional." See, e.g., R. FIELD, B.
KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 85, at 772 ("fraud and force" and immunity from
service); C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 46, at 199 (door-dosing statutes); 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 91, § 3828, at 181 & n.19 (forum non conveniens).
22- The Supreme Court appears devoted to resolving Erie problems by establishing a
series of blanket solutions, each covering a broad area of law; and thus the Court appears
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federal court in such circumstances only the pure-jurisdiction and
forum-reasonableness requirements applicable to the state, thus
closing the federal courthouse doors when the state could not
choose to hear the case but leaving the federal court otherwise
free to realize federal goals of convenience, efficiency, and the
like by means of its own mere-venue provisions.2 4 In the distant
future, if the state and federal court systems do develop similar
schemes of territorial authority to adjudicate, the already small
practical effects of either the current or the proposed approach to
this choice-of-law problem will diminish even further.
II
Restatement Second's

APPROACH

A. Survey of Restatement Second's Treatment of Validity of Judgments
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments in chapter 2 lists three
requirements for a court properly to undertake an adjudication:
notice, territorial jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction. Failure to satisfy any of them forms "a ground for objection to the
maintenance of the proceeding in the court in which it has been
22
brought." 1
First, the Restatement Second requires fair notice, of a suitably
formal appearance, to the affected person or his representative.
Fair notice means either actual notice or notice that is reasonably
certain to result in actual notice and that sufficiently complies
with the procedure prescribed for giving notice. This same requirement applies whether the proceedings are in personam, in
rem, quasi in rem, or otherwise.226

hostile to any more discriminating approach such as case-by-case balancing. See, e.g., Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). But cf. Comment, supra note 84, at
702-09 (proposal to apply state jurisdictional provisions reflecting substantive state interests).
224 Some commentators are justifiably eager to go further than so rethinking Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). They favor statutorily putting all of territorial
authority to adjudicate outside the Erie doctrine, see, e.g., Barrett, supra note 92, at 634-35;
Currie, supra note 107, at 304-05, and even overturning Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), see, e.g., Barrett, supra note 92, at 632-33; cf. Currie, supra note
107, at 305, 310-11 (more cautious approach); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute (pt. 1), 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 27-29 (1968) (same).
"= RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs, Introductory Note to ch. 2, at 1 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1978); see id. § 4 [§ 1].
26 Id. §§ 5-6 (§§ 2-3]; see note 3 supra. The principles therein, as I perceive them, are
sound. But I find their expression obscure, at least relative to the clarity of the rest of the
Restatement Second.
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Second, and critically for the purposes of this Article, Tentative Draft Number 5 of the Restatement Second introduces in section 7 the requirement of territorial jurisdiction and, for states
and the federal sovereign, spells out the interplay of the Constitu-

tion with statutory and other determinants.227 Section 8 permits
"jurisdiction over a person who has a relationship to the state
such that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.""22 Section 9
allows jurisdiction "to determine interests in a thing if the relationship of the thing to the state is such that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable." 2 9 Jurisdiction over status20 and attachment jurisdiction 21' receive similar treatment in sections 10 and
11, respectively.
Third, the Restatement Second treats subject-matter jurisdiction. In delineating this requirement, constitutions and statutes
divide functions among the organs of government, thus accom-

227 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
228

Id. § 8 [§ 5].

- Id. § 9 [§ 6].
Id. § 10 [§ 7]; see 1978 ALI

20

§ 7 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 4].

PROCEEDINGS

104-05.
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 8]. Section

21 RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11

11 soundly spells out the situations where attachment jurisdiction over locally situated
property would be reasonable. However, it fails to recognize the complications of having
also to apply the power test. See, e.g., note 81 and accompanying text supra. There are
other, lesser difficulties.
First, comment g of § 11 apparently suggests the abolition of the limited appearance.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) (indirect abolition by granting preclusive effect to issues litigated pursuant to limited appearance)
[§ 32(c)]. But see 1978 ALI PROCEEDINGS 109 (suggesting Restatement Second takes no position on limited appearances); Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1978) (endorsing appearances restricted in effect) [§ 9]; id., Reporter's Note § 75,
comment d at 104 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) (recognizing possible constitutional impediment to abolition) [§ 32]. It strikes me that a limited appearance without issue-preclusion
effects remains essential to preserving the reasonableness of some marginal exercises of
jurisdiction, such as certain instances of jurisdiction by necessity. See generally Smit, supra
note 140, at 620-22, 627; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 146, at 1139 n.38, 1164
n.137; Note, supra note 80, at 76 & n.48; Note, Limited Appearances and Issue Preclusion:
Resetting the Trap?, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 595 (1981).
Second, comment c of § 11 seems to overstate the problem posed by Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), by construing the case as a sometimes insuperable barrier. On the
other hand, comment d seems to understate the problem by treating Fuentes as inapplicable
in certain relevant circumstances. I think that the Fuentes problem could be solved by a
carefully drafted attachment statute, analogous to the one in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974), but applicable to all seizures of significant property interests for
jurisdictional purposes, or, if need be, by simple abolition of this requirement of actual
seizure. See generally Moore, ProceduralDue Process in Quasi In Rem Actions After Shaffer v.
Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 157, 223-34 (1978).
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modating federal and state authority, separating courts from32 the
other branches, and differentiating one court from another.
While elaborating these three basic requirements, the Restatement Second discusses the procedure for raising them in the original action, 23 as well as the res judicata consequences of raising
them 2 4 and the consequences of failing to raise them. 2 ' Also, in
an elegant and enlightening new section, Professor Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., as Reporter, elucidates the effect that litigating one
claim has on personal jurisdiction for another claim.2
Two incidental points concerning this chapter of the Restatement Second deserve mention. First, it relies heavily on the American Law Institute's earlier work on conflict of laws. 7 Second, an
understanding of chapter 2 requires sorting out its reciprocal relationship with chapter 5, which treats relief from judgment.
Chapter 2 covers the three basic "conditions that ought to exist
(and ordinarily do exist) before a court can assume to decide the
merits. '2 8 However, these are neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for defeating relief from judgment, say, after conclusion of the original action. Instead, judgments not satisfying the
three requirements sometimes and for some purposes have effect
after conclusion of the original action, and judgments meeting
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 11]; see id.,

Comment b. The Restatement Second's definition of subject-matter jurisdiction lacks some
precision. See notes 179 & 181 and accompanying text supra. See also note 4 supra.
233 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13(1) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 10(l)]; id.
§ 14, Comment d [§ 11].
2' Id. § 13(2) [§10(2)]; id.§ 15, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 12].
Id. § 4, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 1]; id.§ 15 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979)
[§ 12].
1 Id. § 12 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 9]. As always, one can find room for disagreement. I would express the rule more along these lines: A state has power over any person
who has appeared in a pending action in a court of the state and may exercise it when the
claim involved may reasonably be determined concurrently with that action. See also notes 21
& 133 supra.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971); see 1978 ALl PROCEEDINGS 63.
Thus, the new work's treatment of territorial jurisdiction "is largely an incorporation by
reference of the applicable provisions of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Reporter's Memorandum at xiv (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978). The new work reflects some updating, but it proceeds in the belief that the earlier
work's currency "remains largely intact." Id. The new work tends simply to mention
"reasonableness" and then refer to the conflicts work. "That is, we have not undertaken
here more fully to elaborate on the boundary line between minimum contacts and what
might be called subminimum contacts." 1978 ALI PROCEEDINGS 98. Accordingly, this chapter of the new work manages to condense 37 sections of RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
(1942) into 12 sections.
"8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to ch. 2, at 6 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1978).
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those requirements sometimes and for some purposes have no
effect. It all depends, for example, on the nature and importance
of the alleged impropriety and on the position of the parties.
Chapter 5 lays out this fluid approach.2 9
B. Critique of Restatement Second's Approach to TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue
Certainly, the critic must beware "too simple an antithesis between an affirmation of what the law is and one as to what it
ought to be." 240 Yet there has been a shift in emphasis from the
early Restatements, which undertook to "dispel uncertainty" by
restating "what the law in point was,"' 4' to the more recent Restatement efforts, which adopt the role of law reform. 42 Rather
than develop subtle reconciliations or select among conflicting
aims, however, I shall simply assume arguendo the antithesis and
evaluate alternatively the attainment of goals.
The Restatement Second, in tentative but approved draft,243 inaccurately states the current law on territorial jurisdiction. Rejecting the power approach of the first Restatement of Judgments,244 the
Restatement Second generally opts for the tempting alternative of
reasonableness. 24s But Shaffer v. Heitner demonstrated and WorldWide explained that the choice is not either-or; instead, both the
power and the reasonableness tests apply. The failure to recog"' See id., at 4-8; id., Introductory Note to ch. 5, at 4-9 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979). The
desirability of this movement away from rules toward fluidity is beyond the scope of this
Artide. But consider the possibility that such fluidity should also extend to the procedure
for raising these requirements in the original action. See, e.g., id. § 14, Comment d (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 11].
210 Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A.J. 147, 149 (1969); see Report of the
Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organizationfor the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, in 1923 ALI PROCEEDINGS 1, 14-18.
241 H. GOODRICH & P. WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 1923-

1961, at 8 (1961); see Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of the
Law, in RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 1, 19 (1945).
242 See Hazard, supra note 89, 66 CORNELL L. Rv. at 587. See generally Wechsler, supra
note 240. This trend received criticism in Helms, The Restatements: Existing Law or Proph-

ecy, 56 A.B.A.J. 152 (1970).
243 See 1978 ALI PROCEEDINGS 165. There was mention that the Institute should reconsider territorial jurisdiction after the dust from Shaffer settled, id. at 102, but reconsideration apparently never occurred, see 48 U.S.L.W. 2835 (1980).
2" See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 5 (1942).
245 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978) (equating "minimum contacts" to reasonableness test) [§ 4]; id. § 8, Comments a-b
[§ 5]; id., Reporter's Note § 8 [§ 5]; id. § 9, Comment e [§ 6]; 1978 ALI PROCEEDINGS
103-04; id. at 117 ("[tlerritorial jurisdiction is a matter of convenience").
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nize this permeates sections 8 through 11, leaving them considerably more permissive than the current law. The draftsman's
remedy would be to superimpose a power test on the reasonableness standard that those sections express for each category of
jurisdiction. Of course, this would be no simple task, considering
the complications of the power test.24
The Restatement Second serves better as a statement of what
the law ought to be, but it preserves a conceptual structure that is
inadequate to get us there. First, acknowledging the existence of
the power test would probably be desirable if only to speed its
demise. Second, section 7 draws an arbitrary, unclear, and ultimately unsound line between jurisdiction and venue.2 4 7 Part of
what it considers venue is jurisdictional in nature, and much of its
jurisdiction is really venue. A detailed consideration of this
boundary suggests that the Restatement Second should have devoted
much greater thought to the idea of venue. I am not suggesting
that the scope of the project should have been broader. Nor am I
suggesting that the product should have included the details of an
ideal venue scheme. Instead, I am criticizing the intellectual structure for territorial authority to adjudicate that the Restatement
Second actually did adopt. And its faulty structure affects the rest
of its work; for example, slighting venue twists its treatment of
relief from judgment. 24 Third, its intellectual frameworks for
state and federal courts do not mesh.249 A formulation based on
power, reasonableness, and a redefined venue would reveal the
commonality of the state and federal schemes and would permit
parallel treatment. In short, making more explicit my presumptuousness, I submit that this Article's reformulation would have
lent a better structure to section 7.
I am admittedly ignoring tactical realities that might demand
compromise and also conformity with earlier works of the American Law Institute. However, I believe that a bolder approach
would better represent current law and accommodate new developments.
214 See notes 144-64 and accompanying text supra.
247 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comments b-c (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1978) (territorial jurisdiction encompasses constitutional and nonconstitutional restrictions) [§ 4], with id., Comment g ("scope of territorial jurisdiction is affected by the principle of forum non conveniens"), and id., Comment h (rules of venue "easily distinguished"
from territorial jurisdiction). See also notes 171-73 and accompanying text supra.
2148See note 218 and accompanying text supra.
2149See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comments a, f (Tent. Draft No. 5,

1978) (confusing shift from framework focusing on restrictions imposed on states to
framework focusing on federal self-restraint) [§ 4]; 1978 ALI PROCEEDINGS 93-95, 106.
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CONCLUSION

Be the aim to convey the law of today or to push it toward a
better law for tomorrow, the proposed tripartite conceptual structure is a fruitful way of viewing state and federal territorial
authority to adjudicate. First, pure territorial jurisdiction is the
constitutional requirement that the sovereign have power over the
target of the action. It is the product of a long history, but should
enjoy a relatively short future. Second, the Constitution demands
that the forum be a reasonable one. This rather recently discerned requirement of forum-reasonableness derives from both
jurisdiction and venue, but should prevail as the sole constitutional test for territorial authority to adjudicate. Third, mere venue
encompasses all nonconstitutional restrictions on geographic selection of forum. A dearer idea of its nature should lead to its more
intelligent use.

